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INFORMAL METHODS OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
CHARLES GARDNER GEYHt
INTRODUCTION
Prior to passage of the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 19801 (the "Act"), when no formal,
explicitly disciplinary process for remedying judicial misconduct (short
of impeachment and removal) existed, many commentators expressed
the concern that a significant volume of judicial misbehavior and
disability was being ignored.2 In the minds of some, the Act and the
t Assistant Professor of Law, Widener University. B.A. 1980, University of
Wisconsin;J.D. 1983, University of Wisconsin. I would like to thank Steve Burbank,
PatrickJohnston, Kathy Nelson, Laura Ray,Judith Resnik, and Emily Field Van Tassel
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts, and Rick Marcus and Tom Willging for
their assistance in developing the Appendix. Thanks also to Tom Beveridge,
Jacqueline Fenstermacher, Don McGahn, and Todd Shill for their excellent research
assistance, and Paula Heider for her help in formatting the Appendix.
Significant segments of this Article were developed in my capacity as a consultant
to the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, and I am indebted
to Chairman Robert W. Kastenmeier, and Director MichaelJ. Remington for giving
me the opportunity to serve the Commission.
1 Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1 (1988)).
2 See, e.g.,Judicial Tenure and Discipline-1979-80: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciay, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1979) (statement of Clark Mollenhoff, Professor
of Journalism, Washington and Lee University) ("[The problems caused by unfit
federaljudges, whether from outright corruption, political favoritism, or inability due
to ill-health or senility, amount to a hidden national scandal."); HAROLD W. CHASE,
FEDERALJUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESs 189 (1972) (estimating that "roughly 10
percent of the federal judges are incapable of doing a first-ratejob due to disabilities
of illness (including falling eyesight and defective hearing) and old age");JOSEPH C.
GOULDEN, THE BENC-WARMERS 11 (1974) ("The federal judiciary is ... peculiarly
exempt from outside scrutiny, insofar as its personalities and politics are concerned.
This is bad, because godawful things happen regularly in the federal courts. Lawyers
know about them, and talk about them at lunch and trade meetings ... ."); DAViD
STEIN,JUDGING THEJUDGES 4 (1974) ("The suggestion is not made that all judges are
crooked or inept or lazy or arrogant or overly ambitious for political, commercial,
financial or professional advancement. But enough judges are in one or more of
those categories to make the entire calling properly suspect."); Larry C. Berkson &
Irene A. Tesitor, HoldingFederalJudges Accountable, 61JJDICATtRE 443,445-46 (1978)
("This paucity of impeachment proceedings, it is argued, is a dear indication that the
procedure is ineffective. Surely, claim proponents of this view, more than nine
federal judges have failed to comport with the high standards ofjudicial office. Their
case is strongly supported by existing evidence."); Sam Nunn,Judicial Tenure, 54 CM.-
KENT L. REV. 29, 31-32 (1977) ("[I]t seems unreasonable to assert that only four
federal judges in our history have misbehaved or have been disabled. On the
contrary, the record is filled with cases ofjudges against whom substantial allegations
(243)
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self-regulatory scheme it codified have dispelled that concern to a
significant extent; for those subscribing to such a view, the paucity of
disciplinary actions taken under the Act is simply a tribute to the
quality of the federal bench.8 Others are less sanguine: judges cannot
be trusted to judge judges, they have argued.4 For these skeptics, the
small number of complaints culminating in discipline under the Act is
evidence ofjudges' unwillingness to regulate themselves.5
were levied and who continued to serve on the federal bench."); Comment, Removal
of Federal Judges-Alternatives to Impeachment, 20 VAND. L. REV. 723, 723 (1967)
("[T]here is considerable feeling that, in a system as large and as overburdened as the
federaljudiciary, a need exists for other procedures to deal withjudges who are unfit
for office through some fault of their own or through physical or mental disability.").
3 See, e.g., THOMAS E. BAKER, THE GOOD JUDGE: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON FEDERALJUDICIAL RESPONSIILITY 77 (1989) ("More
complaints againstjudges have been processed in the eight years under the 1980 act
than in all the years under the impeachment clause. Has the experiment been a
success? The somewhat speculative answer is a qualified yes."); Stephen B. Burbank,
Politics and Progress in Implementing the Federal Judicial Discipline Act, 71 JUDICATURE
13, 22 (1987) ("[The] small number of complaints that have survived to the
investigative stage and the much smaller number that have resulted in sanctions are
proof, not of the councils' inactivity, but rather of the high caliber of the federal
judiciary... The present system is working.").
4 See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Self-Regulation ofJudicial Misconduct Could Be Mis-
Regulation, 89 MICH. L. REv. 609, 615 (1990) ("[T]he very procedures set up by the
judiciary betray a distinctly unfavorable disposition toward complaints about
misbehavior of their fellows. These procedures provide no reassurance thatjudges
can or should self-regulate cases of judicial misconduct."); Carol T. Rieger, The
Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act: Will Judges Judge
Judges?, 37 EMORY L.J. 45, 77 (1988) (questioning the "willingness ofjudges to 'keep
their own houses in order'" under the Act); R.C. Wynn, CallingforImpeachment, TEX.
LAW., Sept. 80, 1991, at 2 ("[lt is obvious that thejudiciary is not capable of policing
itself.... If even a few good men and women lawyers, officers of the courts, are
afraid to stand up, the judiciary will continue to make a mockery of the Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act."); David Margolick, A Glimpse at the Secret System of
Penalizing Judges, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1989, at Al, B8 ("'This is not a system to
sanctionjudges, but to protectjudges against complaints, and one that only the blind
or foolhardy would use,' said Professor Dershowitz, who called the procedure a
'Kafkaesque charade.'") (quoting Alan Dershowitz, Professor of Law, Harvard Law
School).
5 See 132 CONG. REc. S8746 (daily ed. June 26, 1986) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini) ("This act has been largely ignored by the Federal judiciary.... The
record of the past 5 years-a record of inactivity-speaks for itself."); D'Amato, supra
note 4, at 614-15 (arguing that judges have made "the path to complaining about
judicial misbehavior rocky, narrow, incoherent, and fraught with peril," and pointing
to the dearth of corrective actions taken in response to complaints filed under the
Act, as evidence that "[tlhe judges' efforts appear to have worked"); Rieger, supra
note 4, at 94 ("Rather than enhancing respect for the judiciary by allowing judges to
deal with misconduct which may not warrant full impeachment proceedings, the Act
has precipitated a growing number of complaints, most of which have been summarily
dismissed, causing frustration and resentment about thejudiciary's handling of the
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With all eyes focused on the Act, one is left with the impression
that it is, if not the only means of judicial discipline besides impeach-
ment, the only means worth talking about. Yet there have been and
continue to be a number of less visible, less explicitly disciplinary
mechanisms for regulating judicial misconduct and disability. Before
passage of the Act, some of those mechanisms were the subject of
study.6  After the Act became law, however, what little attention
informal methods of judicial discipline received was drowned in a sea
of scholarship analyzing the constitutionality, desirability, and
effectiveness of the formal process the Act established for disciplining
judges. 7 Notwithstanding the lack of attention informal methods have
matters." (footnote omitted)); Alan Dershowitz,Judicial Ethics is in Wrong Hands, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, May 27, 1989, at 18A ("[T]he disciplinary process has become a
paper tiger under Haynsworth's chairmanship.... Congress must look into the
scandal ofjudicial discipline.... But with an unrepentant fox guarding the chicken
coop, it is naive to assume that the ethics of the fox will not persist."); Raoul L.
Felder, Who Judges the Judges?, NEWSDAY, Dec. 4, 1992, at 62 ("The present system
does not discipline judges; rather, it protects and covers up forjudges. Since 1980,
1,300 complaints against federal judges have been lodged nationwide, but only three
federal judges have been publicly reprimanded.").
6 See generally PETER G. FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERALJUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
(1973) (providing a political history of federal court administration); STEVEN
FLANDERS &JOHN T. MCDERMOTr, OPERATION OF THE FEDERALJUDICIAL COUNCILS
(1978) (appraising the effectiveness ofjudicial councils); RUSSELL R. WHEELER & A.
LEO LEvIN,Judicial Discipline and Removal in the United States (1979) (discussing
the formal mechanisms used to regulate judicial conduct); Peter G. Fish, The Circuit
Councils: Rusty Hinges of FederalJudicial Administration, 37 U. CH. L. REV. 203 (1970)
[hereinafter Fish, Rusty Hinges] (discussing the Administrative Office Act); Irving R.
Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681 (1979) (arguing that
informal process should be preferred to a stringent process ofjudicia regulation);
John W. Oliver, Reflections on the History of Circuit Judicial Councils and CircuitJudicial
Conferences, 64 F.R.D. 201 (1975) (making several proposals for increased judicial
efficiency);J. Clifford Wallace,Judicial Administration in a System of Independents: A
Tribe with Only Chiefs, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 39 (attempting to reconcile the conflict
between judicial independence and effective and efficient judicial administration);
Brent D. Ward, Can the Federal Courts Keep Order in Their Own House? Appellate
Supervision Through Mandamus and Orders ofJudicial Councils, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 233
(examining the supervision of lower courts by appellate courts through advisory and
supervisory writs of mandamus and orders ofjudicial councils).
7 Articles analyzing the Act include: Stephen B. Burbank, The Federal Judicial
Discipline Act: Is Decentralized Self-Regulation Working?, 67 JUDICATURE 183 (1983)
(arguing that the Act is deficient because of vagueness and inconsistency within the
policies formulated by the judicial councils); Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural
Rulemaking Under theJudicial Councils Reform andJudicial Conduct and Disability Act of
1980, 131 U. PA. L. Rv. 283 (1982) (same); Harry T. Edwards, Regulating Judicial
Misconduct and Divining "Good Behavior"for Federal Judges, 87 MICH. L. REv. 765
(1989) (arguing for the desirability of judicial self-regulation in matters where
1993]
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received in the thirteen years that the Act has been in place, a
significant body of evidence points to the conclusion that some of these
preexisting, informal disciplinary mechanisms are thriving, and are
doing so not despite, but because of the formal disciplinary process.
The limited visibility of informajudicial discipline ordinarily places
it beyond public scrutiny and renders it subject to criticism on that
ground. Nevertheless, evidence that informal discipline is administered
regularly and effectively belies the assertion that the small number of
complaints culminating in discipline under the Act translates into a
significant volume of unaddressed incidents ofjudicial misconduct and
disability.
For purposes of discussion here, informal disciplinary or quasi-
disciplinary mechanisms are divided into two groups. The first group
consists of "tools of judicial administration," which include two
disciplinary or quasi-disciplinary mechanisms worthy of note: (1)
orders and actions of the circuit judicial councils, and (2) actions and
communications of chief circuit and district judges.8  The second
impeachment and criminal action are not at issue); C. Randolph Fishburn,
ConstitutionalJudicial Tenure Legislation?-The Words May Be New, but the Song Sounds
the Same, 8 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 843 (1981) (arguing that the framers of the
Constitution correctly limited judicial regulation to impeachment); Collins T.
Fitzpatrick, Misconduct and Disability of Federal Judges: The Unreported Informal
Responses, 71 JUDICATURE 282 (1988) (arguing that the Act bolsters the informal
methods of regulating judicial misconduct and disability); Robert W. Kastenmeier &
Michael J. Remington, Judicial Discipline: A Legislative Perspective, 76 KY. L.J. 763
(1988) (advocating reliance on the Act as a starting point for judicial reform); Eric
Neisser, The New FederalJudicial Discipline Act: Some Questions Congress Didn't Answer,
65 JUDICATURE 143 (1981) (exploring aspects of the Act and offering possible
interpretations); MichaelJ. Remington, Circuit Council Reform: A Boat Hook forJudges
and Court Administrators, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 695 (discussing the Act as it applied to
the circuit judicial councils); Comment,Judicial Misconduct and Politics in the Federal
System: A Proposal for Revising the Judicial Councils Act, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1071 (1987)
(criticizing the Act for internal inconsistencies and proposing revisions); see also supra
notes 2-4.
8 Other mechanisms could be added. The Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 476 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), for example, requires eachjudicial district to publish
semi-annually, a list of district judges and the motions, bench trials, and cases each
judge has had pending over a specified period of time. To the extent that
inexcusable delay is a form ofjudicial misconduct, § 476 would properly qualify as
a quasi-disciplinary mechanism calculated to embarrass judges into keeping abreast
of their dockets. See KatherineJ. HenryJudicial Discipline Through the CivilJustice
Reform Act's Data Collection and Dissemination Requirements, in 1 RESEARCH PAPERS OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ONJUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL 859, 860-61 (1993)
[hereinafter RESEARCH PAPERS] (article appears as Appendix C to Charles G. Geyh,
Means ofjudicial Discipline Other Than Those Prescribed by the Judicial Discipline Statute,
28 U.S.C. Section 372(c), in RESEARCH PAPERS, supra, at 713); R. Lawrence Dessem,
Judicial Reporting Under the Civil Reform Act: Look, Mom, No Cases!, 54 U. PnTT. L. REv.
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group, "methods of judicial socialization," includes two additional
devices that can be quasi-disciplinary in nature: (1) judicial review,
including mandamus, and (2) "peer pressure" among judges.
This Article explores the circumstances in which the above
mechanisms are used, assesses how well they work, and discusses a
number of proposals to improve or modify their operation. Such an
undertaking is complicated by two factors: (1) most primary research
and secondary literature on the subject predates the 1980 Act, and so
is not necessarily descriptive of current practice, and (2) most of the
disciplinary measures at issue here are informal, and thus "off the
record," making it difficult to assess the frequency and effectiveness
with which such measures are used. In an effort to gather more
information about the disciplinary methods under investigation,
questionnaires were distributed to all present and former chief circuit
judges, forty-five in all, of whom thirty-six responded, thirty-one by
completing the questionnaire. Copies of the questionnaires and
summaries of the responses are included as the Appendix to this
Article. In a related effort, interviews of several present and former
chief circuit judges were conducted by Jeffrey Barr, of the National
Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, and Thomas Willging,
of the Federal Judicial Center. Segments of their interview transcripts
are quoted throughout this Article. Those interviews were conducted
with the understanding that no material would be published that could
reveal the identity of either the chiefjudge being interviewed, or other
judges whose disciplinary problems the chief judge discussed. I have
taken care to honor that understanding here.9
687 (1993); Charles G. Geyh, Adverse Publicity as a Means of ReducingJudicial Decision-
Making Delay: Periodic Disclosure of Pending Motions, Bench Trials and Cases Under the
Civil Justice Reform Act, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 1993). The Code of
Conduct for U.S.Judges is likewise relevant to the control ofjudicial misconduct. See
generally Beth Nolan, The Role ofJudicial Ethics in the Discipline and Removal of Federal
Judges, in RESEARCH PAPERS, supra, at 867 (discussing the interplay of the Code's
ethical principles and misconduct). So too, are judicial education programs
conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, to say nothing of the individual judge's
sense of right and wrong.
This Article examines the general, informal disciplinary mechanisms that address
judicial misconduct and disability after they have occurred. Mechanisms narrowly
targeted to address specific problems such as decision-making delay have thus been
excluded. Mechanisms that may prevent misconduct and disability problems from
arising in the first place, such as the Code of Conduct and educational programs, are
likewise beyond the scope of this Article.
9 See Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willging, Decentralized Self-Regulation, Ac-
countability, andJudicial Independence Under the FederalJudicial Conduct and Disability
Act of 1980, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 25, 31-32 (1993).
1993)
248 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:243
I. WHEN INFORMAL METHODS OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE ARE USED
Initially, it is helpful to identify the processes through which
judicial misconduct or disability is likely to be addressed, if at all, by
means other than disciplinary action pursuant to the Act. There are
two such circumstances: (1) a complaint is filed but the Act is deemed
inapplicable; and (2) a complaint is not filed.
A. A Complaint Is Filed, but the Act Is Deemed Inapplicable
The Act does not necessarily apply to all episodes of judicial
misbehavior.10 By its terms, the statute's application is limited to
situations in which (1) the judge or judicial officer has "engaged in
conduct,"" (2) the conduct is serious enough to be "prejudicial to the
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts,"12 and (3) the misbehavior is not "directly related to the
merits of a decision or procedural ruling."'
3
It is, of course, impossible to ascertain precisely how often episodes
ofjudicial misbehavior are made the subject of informal disciplinary or
quasi-disciplinary action after it has already been dismissed as outside
10 In delineating the range of less than "good" behavior arguably outside the reach
of the Act, discussion will be largely confined to misconduct. The statutory language
at issue in Parts I.A.1. and I.A.2., infra, applies only to misconduct complaints. The
language at issue in Part I.A.3., infra, on the other hand, permitting dismissal of
complaints if they relate to the merits of a decision or ruling, applies to disability
complaints too. For example, a bonafide complaint of disability might be dismissed
pursuant to § 332(c)(3)(A)(ii), as relating to the merits of a decision, should the
disability be manifested in the judge's opinions or rulings. In such a situation,
recourse to other remedies, including judicial council orders certifying disability
under § 372(b) might be necessary. A review of complaints filed under § 372(c),
however, suggests that this issue has yet to arise. For an excellent discussion of the
complaints filed, see Richard L. Marcus, Who Should Discipline Federal Judges, and
How?, 149 F.R.D. 375 (1993); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(c)(3)(A)((ii), 372(b)-(c) (1988
& Supp. IV 1992). Thus, while the discussion in Part I.A.3., infra, may be as
applicable to disability as misconduct, discussion is confined to the latter.
" 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
12 Id.
"s § 372(c)(3)(A)(ii). Two other qualifications specified in the statute need be
mentioned only in passing. One is that frivolous complaints of misconduct may be
dismissed. See § 372(c)(3)(A)(iii). If a complaint is frivolous, however, the reasons for
refusing to apply the discipline statute would apply equally to any of the other
disciplinary or quasi-disciplinary measures at issue in this article. Another is that the
chiefjudge may "conclude the proceeding" if she finds that "corrective action has
been taken." § 372(c)(3)(B). In such instances, the Act applies to the conduct at
issue, and any "corrective action" taken is taken pursuant to the Act. Given that this
Article addresses disciplinary measures outside of the Act, the operation of
§ 372(c)(3)(B) will not be discussed here.
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the scope of the statute. That this occurs, however, is confirmed by
former Chief Judge Paul Roney of the Eleventh Circuit, who stated that
"[t]he act produces substantial indirect benefits. It brings to the
attention of the chiefjudge matters that may not fall within the statute
but nevertheless deserve attention. The procedure gives the chief
judge the opportunity to correct these matters."14 Of twenty-nine
present and former chief circuit judges expressing an opinion in the
questionnaire, twenty-seven agreed with Judge Roney.15
1. The Judge or Judicial Officer Must Have
"Engaged in Conduct"
The Act permits persons alleging that a judge has "engaged in
conduct" sanctionable under the statute to file a complaint. Com-
plaints "not in conformity" with this requirement may be dismissed.
Read literally, the statute suggests to some that a complaint should be
dismissed if it alleges that a judge failed to engage in conduct in which
she should have engaged. Thus, for example, complaints alleging that
ajudge has unjustifiably delayed decision-making or has neglected her
cases, arguably fall outside the scope of conduct regulated by the Act.
The same might be said of complaints alleging that a judge did not
intercede where intercession was warranted, in response to events of
one sort or another transpiring in the court room.
SeniorJudge and former ChiefJudgeJohn Godbold testified before
the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal that the
question, "Does the statute include failures to act?" is a matter
generating great differences of opinion among the chief judges.16 It
wasJudge Godbold's sense that "most chief circuitjudges think it is not
within the statute," although he held "the opposite view."
17
Judge Godbold's opposing view can be defended without doing
violence to the text of the Act. The dictionary definition of "conduct"
refers to the synonym "behavior,"18 which in turn is defined as the
14 Letter from Paul H. Roney, Chief Judge of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, to judge Elmo B. Hunter, Chairman, Committee on Court Administration,
Judicial Conference of the United States (Sept. 30, 1987) (on file with authors).
15 See infra app., question 4.
16 Transcript of Hearings Before the National Commission on judicial Discipline
and Removal 62 (May 1, 1992) [hereinafter NCJDR Hearings] (testimony ofJohn C.
Godbold, Senior Circuit Judge, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals) (on file with
author).
17 id.
i8 See THE AMEICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 393 (3d
ed. 1992).
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manner in which one "act(s), react(s), function(s) or perform(s)." 19
One manner in which a person can react, function, or perform in
response to a given situation is not to act at all. Accordingly, inaction,
at least in common parlance, qualifies as a form of behavior or
"conduct."
However, even to the extent that the phrase "engaged in conduct"
is read literally to exclude failures to act, one could still argue that a
judge who fails to act, if under a duty to act, has "engaged in conduct"
within the meaning of the Act. Criminal law provides a logical parallel:
Crimes such as homicide are usually defined to require affirmative acts,
such as the killing of another person, and are generally inapplicable to
persons who, through inaction, permit another to die.20 An excep-
tion exists, however, in cases where a person has an affirmative duty to
act. Thus, for example, a parent who neglects an affirmative duty to
protect his child, which results in the child's death, may be found guilty
of homicide.
By the same token, federal judges take an oath in which each
assumes an affirmative duty to "administer justice" and to "faithfully
and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon
[her] . . . according to the best of [her] abilities." 21 One might fairly
conclude that ajudge's failure to act, if "prejudicial to the effective and
expeditious administration of justice," is a dereliction of the duty
spelled out in that oath. If so, the fact that the Act may be read
literally to exclude failures to act should not render it inapplicable to
judicial inaction.
The argument that the Act is inapplicable to failures to act does not
actually appear to have support within the federal judiciary. No chief
judge responding to the question of whether they ordinarily dismiss
complaints of excessive decision-making delay said "yes" on the
grounds that the statute does not reach failure to act.22
2. The Conduct Must Be "Prejudicial to the Effective
and Expeditious Administration of the
Business of the Courts"
Records of disciplinary proceedings reflect that complaints are
occasionally dismissed because the behavior complained of, even if
19 Id. at 167.
20 For a general discussion of omissions to act in criminal law, see WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AusTIN W. SCoTT,JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 3.2, at 282-96 (1986).
21 28 U.S.C. § 453 (Supp. IV 1992).
22 See infra app., question 12.
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troublesome to some degree, is insufficiently significant to be
"prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the
business of the courts."28 The Ninth Circuit has dismissed complaints
of delayed decision-making on such grounds. Characterizing the
purpose of the formal disciplinary process as being "to promote 'the
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts
... ' by providing a means for dealing with systematic inability or
unwillingness to perform the duties of the judicial office," the court has
declined to discipline isolated instances of decision-making delay in the
absence of a "broader pattern of conduct."
24
The Second Circuit has taken a similar tack. In a 1987 status
report to the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration,
the chief judge explained that "if a complainant asserts that a matter
has been pending before ajudicial officer for a lengthy period of time,
copies of the filings in question are requested so that a determination
may be made on whether there is a pattern of lengthy delay."25
Likewise, in the Fourth Circuit, prospective complainants are given an
informational notice advising them of what conduct is subject to the
Act. The notice states that the phrase "'engaged in conduct prejudicial
to the effective and expeditious administration of the courts'... could
include habitual failure to decide matters in a timely fashion."26
23 § 372(c)(1).
24 In re Charge of'Judicial Misconduct, 593 F.2d 879, 881 (9th Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted) (quoting the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council's procedures for processing
complaints ofjudicial misconduct). Although this case arose prior to passage of the
Act, it was decided pursuant to procedures established by the Ninth CircuitJudidal
Council, which were substantially similar to those later codified in the Act. The
language quoted from the opinion has since been applied to proceedings under the
Act. See In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 782 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1986).
Moreover, ChiefJudge Browning, who authored both of these decisions, also chaired
the Special Committee of the Conference of Chief Judges that developed the
Illustrative Rules, which adopted a similar position. See SPECIAL COMM. OF THE
CONFERENCE OF CHIEFJUDGES OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS, ILLUSTRATIVE RULES
GOVERNING COMPLAINTS OFJUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AND DISABLMY, Rule 1(e) (1986)
,(original version of the rules). The Illustrative Rules were recendy revised in response
to the passage of the Judicial Improvement Act of 1990 and were circulated to the
courts covered by the Act to provide a guide for the modification of local court rules.
See Memorandum from the Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and
Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the United States to the ChiefJudges
of the United States Courts of Appeals, the United States Court of International
Trade, and the United States Claims Court 1 (Aug. 15, 1991) [hereinafter ILLUSTRA-
T RULES] (on file with author).
25 Letter from Wilfred Feinberg, ChiefJudge, Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
to Judge Elmo B. Hunter, Chairman Committee on Court Administration,
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 4 (Sept. 23, 1987) (emphasis added) (on file
with author).
26 Letter from Harrison L. Winter, ChiefJudge of the Fourth Circuit Court of
1993]
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In the Ninth Circuit, the chief judge has dismissed complaints of
concededly extreme delay. In one case, a complaint was dismissed on
the grounds that there was no showing of a habitual problem,
notwithstanding that a panel of the Court of Appeals had been
"appalled" by the extent of the delay. 27 The questionnaire to chief
circuit judges revealed that of sixteen judges indicating that they did
ordinarily dismiss complaints of decision-making delay, ten did so at
least in part because delay in isolated cases did not constitute conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice. Moreover, of the nine
judges who said they did not ordinarily dismiss such complaints, four
indicated that complaints were dismissed if the delay proved not to be
habitual. 28
A look at the background of the phrase "prejudicial to the effective
and expeditious administration of the business of the courts" reveals
that exclusion of decision-making delay from its scope is a recent
phenomenon. The phrase did not make its debut in the Act. Prior to
1980, the Administrative Office Act2g authorized the circuit judicial
councils to make "all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts."3 0 Fish notes that under
that Act, the judicial councils issued orders responding to isolated
complaints of delay "from the beginning."3 ' Similarly, a 1978 study
of the federal judicial councils by Flanders and McDermott refers to
"several instances in which a council took action when ajudge's docket
became backlogged because of a particular case."3 2 That the judicial
Appeals to judge Elmo B. Hunter, Chairman, Committee on Court Administration,
Judicial Conference of the United States (Sept. 30, 1987) (emphasis added) (quoting
a notice from the clerk of the court to persons considering filing complaints of
judicial misconduct or disability) (on file with author).27 See In re Charge ofJudicial Misconduct, Nos. 89-80366, 89-80367 (9th Cir.Jud.
Council filed June 12, 1990) (rejecting a charge that the judge unduly delayed
deciding a case because no showing was made that "the judge delays in a substantial
number of cases or that the judge's failure is persistent"); see also Marcus, supra note
10, at 414 (noting that chiefjudges "almost always dismiss complaints for delay").28 See infra app., question 12.
29 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 902 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1 (1988)).
30 Id. § 332 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1988)). In 1980, the word
"justice" was substituted for the phrase "business of the courts," in order to clarify
and enlarge the judicial council's authority. See Pub. L. No. 96-458, § 2(a)-(d)(1), 94
Stat. 2035 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1) (1988)); see also
Remington, supra note 7, at 725-26 (suggesting that the new wording was intended
to include "the institutional appearance ofjustice" under the scope of the Act).
31 FISH, supra note 6, at 401; see also infra part II.A.1.
32 FLANDERS & McDERMOTr, supra note 6, at 32. For a more thorough analysis
of the judicial councils' general powers as they relate to decision-making delay, see
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councils have historically tackled complaints of decision-making delay
in individual cases, under their authority to issue orders necessary for
the "effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts," suggests, at least, that in appropriate cases, such delays should
likewise be treated as prejudicial to judicial administration under the
Act.
Delay is not, however, the only instance in which a complaint may
be dismissed on the grounds that problematic conduct is not problem-
atic enough. In the Ninth Circuit, for example, a complaint was filed
with respect to a district judge's handling of a status conference. The
chief circuit judge dismissed the complaint. While the chief judge
alluded to problems significant enough to merit corrective action, he
concluded that the judge's handling of the conference did not rise to
the level of prejudice to judicial administration.38
In short, misconduct complained of may have to reach a certain
magnitude before it will be deemed prejudicial to judicial administra-
tion. Misconduct falling short of that level must be handled, if at all,
by other means.
3. The Conduct Must Not Be Directly Related to the
Merits of a Decision or Procedural Ruling
An operating assumption of the Act, expressed in § 372(c)(3)(A)(ii),
is that ifjudicial misconduct relates to the merits of ajudge's decision
or ruling, the problem is better addressed by the appellate process than
by the disciplinary process. Complaints relating to the merits of
decisions and rulings are therefore routinely dismissed. The Adminis-
trative Office of U.S. Courts reports that of the 195 proceedings
terminated by chief judges in 1991, 162 (eighty-three percent) were
dismissed on the grounds that they related directly to the merits of a
judicial proceeding.3 4
At least two distinct questions of scope are presented by that
provision of the Act authorizing the chiefjudge to dismiss complaints
relating to the merits of a decision. The first arises in situations that
present an extant, though remote, opportunity for appeal: "Is anything
that arose in the course of a proceeding out of bounds for a com-
plaint," asked former Chief Judge Patricia Wald of the District of
infra part ll.A.
33 See In re Charge ofJudicial Misconduct, No. 87-8135 (9th Cir.Judicial Council
Aug. 3, 1988).
34 See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR. JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 117-18 (1991).
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Columbia Circuit, "or is behavior that might have been appealed as a
fundamental deprivation of due process (i.e., the lack of an unbiased
judge) still a permissible subject of a complaint?"3 5 The District of
Columbia Circuit, Chief Judge Wald explained, "operated on the
assumption that if a complainant had requested and been denied
recusal of a judge, that decision could have been appealed in the
regular judicial process and so could not form the basis of a com-
plaint."3 6 On the other hand, she added, "I gather by reading some
decisions in other Circuits, there may indeed be conduct by ajudge in
the course of proceedings, that while possibly appealable, is still
considered a legitimate subject of complaint."3 7
The other problem of scope relates, once again, to the issue of
delay. Isolated instances of excessive decision-making delay might
conceivably be dismissed on two grounds: (1) the statute does not
reach failures to act; and (2) absent a pattern of delay, tardy decisions
in individual cases are not prejudicial to judicial administration. To
these two rationales may be added a third: mandamus, and not
disciplinary proceedings, may be the proper remedy for decisional
delay.
In dismissing a complaint that "the judge has not rendered
judgment in a pending matter quickly enough," the Ninth Circuit
opined that the disciplinary procedures were "not intended to provide
a tactical option to counsel in litigation .... If ajudge fails or refuses
to enter judgment in a particular case when the circumstances require
that judgment be entered, a petition for mandamus ... provides an
adequate remedy."8 A subsequent report on the implementation of
the Act in the Ninth Circuit explained that "[m]ostjudicial misconduct
complaints dismissed by the chiefjudge concern the merits of ajudge's
ruling or decision."3 9 The Report describes one class of such com-
plaints as those involving allegations that "the judge unduly delayed
taking action in a case (22% of the 1985 complaints)." 40
35 Memorandum from Patricia Wald, ChiefJudge, D.C. Circuit, to Judge Elmo
Hunter, Chairman, Committee on Court AdministrationJudicial Conference of the
United States 7 (Sept. 25, 1987) [hereinafter Wald Memorandum] (on file with
author).
36 Id. at 6.37 Id.
38 In re Charge ofJudicial Misconduct, 593 F.2d 879, 880-81 (9th Cir. 1979).
39 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTu CIRcurr, REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THEJUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DxsABILrrr ACT OF 1980 IN THE NINTHJUDICL4L CmCurr
11 (1987).40 Id. at 11-12.
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Similarly, in the Eighth Circuit, then Chief Judge Donald Lay
explained that "[i]n cases where the complaints relate to the failure of
the trial judge to make a timely ruling, I have referred these matters to
the court to be filed as petitions for mandamus."4 1 The Second
Circuit, in contrast, appears to have dismissed complaints of delay on
the grounds that they are related to the merits only if the complainant
had actually filed a petition for a writ of mandamus.4 2 Responses to
the chief circuit judge questionnaire lend additional support to the
conclusion that complaints of decision-making delay are sometimes
dismissed as related to the merits of the case. Of sixteen judges
responding that they ordinarily dismissed such complaints, eleven
indicated that they did so at least partly because delays are properly
remedied by petitions for mandamus and therefore relate to the merits
of a decision or ruling.
43
The propriety of dismissing complaints of decision-making delay on
the grounds that the matter can be resolved in a mandamus petition
turns upon a construction of § 372 (c)(3)(A)(ii). A literal reading of
that section does not easily accommodate an interpretation that delay
complaints are to be summarily dismissed as relating to the merits of
a decision or ruling. While one could argue that neglect or failure to
decide is, in effect, a "decision" to do nothing, the merits of which may
be challenged in a mandamus petition, a more reasonable interpreta-
tion is that the conduct complained of in such cases is not a decision or
ruling, but the complete absence of a decision or ruling. Dismissal in
such instances appears to turn less on a strict construction of the
statutory text than on an interpretation of its spirit and purpose:
disciplinary action under the statute was not intended as a substitute
for judicial review. If mandamus or appeal is or would have been
available to remedy the conduct complained of, the complaint should
be dismissed.
The operating assumption of this approach is that the Act serves a
gap-filling function, in which its availability is limited to situations in
which appeal or mandamus is unavailable. Given that appeal or
mandamus is available when delays turn outrageous and when
courtroom misconduct becomes so extreme as to deprive litigants of
41 Letter from Donald Lay, ChiefJudge, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, to Judge
Elmo Hunter, Chairman, Court Administration Committee, Judicial Conference of
the United States 1 (Sept. 21, 1987) (on file with author).42 SeeJtUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT, COMPLAINTS FILED PURSUANT
TO THE JUDICIAL COUNCILS REFORM AND JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DIsABILITy ACT OF
1980 4-5 (1987).
43 See infra app., question 12.
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fundamental due process, the paradox of this approach is that the
severity of judicial misconduct becomes inversely related to the
applicability of the Act. That is, the more outrageous the delay or the
more extreme the courtroom misconduct, the more available becomes
appeal or mandamus, and the less available becomes discipline. The
alternative to such a paradoxical approach is to read § 372(c)(8)(A)(ii)
more literally, to permit dismissal only in cases of complaints question-
ing the correctness of judges' rulings or decisions. Under this
interpretation, the fact that misconduct could be challenged on appeal
or in a petition for mandamus would not render the complaint
dismissible, as long as the misconduct complained of did not pertain
to the merits of an actual ruling or decision.44
How § 372(c)(3)(A)(ii) is interpreted has an obvious effect on the
role played by other disciplinary mechanisms. Particularly where no
appeal or mandamus petition is filed, and the opportunity to file has
passed, legitimate complaints of judicial misconduct that have been
dismissed because the litigant could have appealed or filed for
mandamus may be among the strongest candidates for other remedial
action.
B. The Act May Apply, but No Complaint Is Filed
As indicated in the preceding section, methods ofjudicial discipline
independent of those specified in the Act may be brought to bear in a
variety of circumstances in which the conduct in question is deemed to
fall outside the scope of the statute. A second situation in which other
methods of judicial discipline may come into play is where a formal
complaint is never filed, regardless of whether the conduct at issue
would be sanctionable under the Act. One chiefjudge stated to Barr
and Willging: "In my experience here, the most serious allegations of
misconduct never hit the complaint process."45 Most judges respond-
ing to the questionnaire agreed.4 6
Incidents of alleged misconduct can come to the attention of those
in a position to administer discipline in a variety of ways other than
through a formal complaint. Under the Illustrative Rules, a complaint
44 Even under this narrower interpretation, complaints challenging a judge's
refusal to recuse him or herself might properly be dismissed. Such complaints were
is the focus ofJudge Wald's concern. See Wald Memorandum, supra note 35, at 6-7;
supra text accompanying note 35.
45 Unpublished interview with federal judge (transcript on file with Barr &
Willing).
4?See infra app., question 3.
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is not recognized as such for purposes of the Act unless it is signed and
verified.4" Anonymous complaints, informal complaints or reports,
press reports of judicial misconduct or disability, and rumors of
misconduct or disability circulated via the office grapevine therefore do
not qualify as "complaints" triggering the § 372(c) process.
To better understand why legitimate complaints of judicial
misconduct may never be formalized, it is helpful to group prospective
complainants into one of two categories: court "outsiders," such as
lawyers, litigants, jurors, witnesses, and observers, including the press;
and court "insiders," such as fellow judges, clerks, and other court
personnel.
Court outsiders may not file a complaint for a variety of reasons.
They may be unaware that a problem exists, as in the case of a drinking
problem known only to the judge's colleagues." Or they may be
aware of the problem, but feel it is insufficiently significant to justify
a formal complaint. Victims ofjudicial misconduct who happen to win
their lawsuits, for example, may no longer have the impetus to pursue
a complaint through the administrative process.4" Or they may regard
the problem as significant, but do not wish to alienate the judge by
filing a complaint. This is particularly true of the "repeat players" in
the process-lawyers-who are reluctant to file complaints againstjudges
before whom they routinely appear.5 0
47 See ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 24, Rules 2(f), 3(d).
4 8 One chiefjudge responding to the questionnaire noted that while complaints
under the Act captured 81% to 90% of courtroom misconduct, they captured only
11% to 20% of all other misconduct. See IndividualJudges' Responses to Question-
naire (on file with author). Flanders and McDermott note that "excessive drinking"
was "the most common" problem reported to them. FLANDERS & MCDERMOTT, supra
note 6, at 31.
4' The net effect is that the vast majority of complaints are filed by litigants who
have lost their cases. See Wald Memorandum, supra note 35, at 9. ("[c]andidly, our
experience has almost universally been with disappointed litigants or national
organizations"); see also Edwards, supra note 7, at 793 (characterizing the Act as
burdening the judiciary with "the needless work generated by disaffected litigants").
' Asked if he had ever used the Act to file a complaint about the delay in
disposition of a motion or case, Alan Morrison, Director of the Public Citizen
Litigation Group, responded:
No. I guess I never thought of actually using it at all.
... [I]fI'm reluctant to file mandamus petitions ... this would be even
more of a problem for me because it suggests that something ought to
happen to the judge. And as a regular litigator in the federal courts, it's
hard enough to file a mandamus petition. But this would be awfully
difficult to do.
Judicial Discipline and Removal Hearings, supra note 16, at 224-25 (testimony of Alan
Morrison, Esq.); see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 282 (noting that attorneys'
reluctance to file judicial misconduct complaints often stems from "fear the judge
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As one chief judge said in an interview with Barr and Willging:
"Lawyers are reluctant to file complaints and will do it only in a serious
case."5 1 Echoed another judge, "It's very difficult for a practicing
lawyer to file a complaint, they're in constant practice before the judge.
Yet, those are the complaints that tend to require some action or
caution on my part."52 Even if the court outsider ultimately steels
herself to file a written, verified complaint, the complaint may, at least
in some jurisdictions, be rejected by the clerk's office if it is not
submitted on the circuit's preprinted complaint form.
53
Court insiders may be even less likely to resort to filing formal
complaints. 54 Employees who work alongside the judge on a daily
basis cannot be expected, except in the most unusual of circumstances,
to step forward and complain about that judge's conduct. For the
judges themselves, the disincentives to filing formal complaints against
their colleagues are at least as great. The judiciary has historically
handled its disciplinary problems quietly, privately, and in its view,
effectively.55 As discussed in Part II.A., the mechanisms for adminis-
tering discipline in this manner remain in place. From the judge's
perspective the only purpose served by filing a formal complaint may
be the disruption of collegiality among the judges in the circuit. Since
1990, chief circuit judges have had the authority to "identify" com-
plaints and initiate § 372(c) proceedings on the basis of information
coming to their attention informally.5 6 To date, however, it is a
might be prejudiced against their current or future clients").
51 See supra note 45.
52 Barr & Willging, supra note 9, at 134.
53 See Judicial Independence-Discipline and Conduct: Hearings on H.R. 1620, 1930,
and 2181 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of
Justice of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 365 (1989) (testimony
ofJanice Kamenir-Reznik, President of California Women Lawyers).
' In the Ninth Circuit, over 95% of the complaints received as of 1987 were filed
by individuals concerning lawsuits with respect to which they had an interest. See
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH CIRcurr, supra note 39, at 9. This suggests that less
than five percent of the complaints received by the Ninth Circuit could have been
filed by court insiders.
55 As one former chief judge has said of the circuit judicial council, which
historically has been the primary administrator of discipline within the federal
judiciary (see infra part II.A.): "[W]e believe its success may be measured by its lack
of visibility. We suspect that some who have criticized councils for inactivity are
unmindful of the saw that still waters run deep, and that the most effective actions
are often the most inconspicuous." Nolan v.Judicial Council of the Third Circuit (In
re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc.), 481 F.2d 41, 47 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880
(1973).
56 SeeJudicial Discipline and Removal Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 402(a),
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power that has rarely been exercised.5 7 Barr and Wilging's interviews
with chief circuit judges suggest that identification of complaints is
reserved for truly serious cases: "There was a case where I identified
a complaint. I thought it would have been improper to call the judge
informally in that case. It was a serious allegation, it required on the
record, formal treatment."
58
It is clear that judicial misconduct often comes to the attention of
chief circuit judges by means other than a formal complaint. Twenty-
three of thirty chief circuit judges reported that they had investigated
allegations of misconduct coming to their attention informally.59 A
majority of judges indicated that less than forty percent of the true
misconduct coming to their attention was ever the subject of a
complaint, and only three of twenty-five judges put the figure as high
as ninety-one to one hundred percent.
60
To the extent that formal complaints are neither filed by complain-
ants nor identified by chief judges, the § 372(c) process is not
triggered, and the conduct at issue must be addressed, if at all, by some
other means. Having outlined the circumstances in which disciplinary
methods other than those specified in the Act may come into play, a
closer look will be taken in Parts II and III at what those disciplinary
methods are and the processes they entail.
II. INFORMAL DISCIPLINE AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
As noted in the introduction, a number of disciplinary or quasi-
disciplinary measures may be characterized as tools of judicial
administration. Judicial administration has been defined to encompass
the development and implementation of policies "designed to enable
courts to dispose-justly, expeditiously, and economically-of the
disputes brought to them for resolution." 61 Such a definition is quite
104 Stat. 5122, 5122 (1990) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 372 (c)(1) (Supp. IV
1992)).
" Only three chiefjudges responding to the questionnaire reported that they have
identified complaints pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 372. See infra app., question 6.c.2.
Barr and WilIging may have identified one additional chiefjudge who has resorted
to the procedure. See Barr & Willging, supra note 9, at 138.5 8 See supra note 45.
59 See infra app., question 5.a.
60 See infra app., question 3.
61 Russell WheelerJudicialReform:BasicIssues andReferences, 8 POL'YSTUD.J. 134,
135 (1979); see also RUSSELL WHEELER & H. WHircoMB, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION:
TEXT AND READINGS 1-12 (1977); A. Leo Levin, Research inJudicialAdministration: The
Federal Fxperience, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 237, 238 (1981) (quoting Wheeler's
definition ofjudicial administration).
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broad, reaching issues ranging from the "mechanics of budget
administration, and the determination of how many deputy clerks are
needed in a particular court" to "the scope of the rulemaking power,
the use of staff attorneys to process appeals, the structure of ajudicial
system and the processes of insuring stability in the law of a circuit."
62
The means taken to discipline misconduct, discourage decision-
making delays, and address disabilities, insofar as they facilitate the just
and expeditious disposition of disputes, are fairly characterized as
judicial administration policies. Two such means are elaborated upon
in this section: (1) orders and actions of the circuit judicial councils;
and (2) actions and communications of the chief circuit and district
judges.
A. Orders and Actions of the Circuit Judicial Councils
The circuit judicial councils are administrative bodies established
in each of the judicial circuits. They are comprised of the chief circuit
judge and an equal number of circuit and district judges.63 The many
and varied duties of the circuit judicial councils are spelled out in
thirty-three different sections of the U.S. Code.64 Two of those
sections are of special interest here: (1) § 332(d)(1), which authorizes
each council to "make all necessary and appropriate orders for the
effective and expeditious administration of justice within its circuit";
and (2) § 372(b), which authorizes the councils to certify a judge as
disabled by majority vote.
62 Id. at 239.
63 See 28 U.S.C. § 332(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992). The total number ofjudges serving
on the council is determined by a vote of all active judges in the circuit. Prior to
1990, the composition of the council was limited to circuit judges, together with a
minimum of two or three districtjudges. See 28 U.S.C. § 332(a)(1)(C)(i)-(ii) (1988).
Prior to 1980, the councils were comprised entirely of circuitjudges. See Administra-
tive Office Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, § 305, 53 Stat. 1223, 1224. The
composition of the councils has long been a contentious issue, with district judges
historically desirous of greater representation than the circuitjudges were willing to
cede. See FISH, supra note 6, at 252-53, 310-11, 380-82. The composition of the
councils may be relevant to their effectiveness as disciplinary bodies. Participation
by districtjudges may improve the councils' sensitivity to problems confronting the
trial courts, and enhance the legitimacy of the councils in the minds of districtjudges,
who are, after all, the councils' primary regulatees. See infra text accompanying note
101.
64 For a list of those sections and a summary of what they provide, see Geyh,
Means ofJudicial Discipline, supra note 8, app. B.
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1. The Judicial Councils' General Authority to Make Orders
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1)
a. The Administrative Office Act of 1939
The Administrative Office Act of 1939 created the circuit judicial
councils and authorized them to act in furtherance of effective and
expeditious judicial administration.6 5 Professor Peter Fish's outstand-
ing political history ofjudicial administration is an appropriate starting
point for an analysis of the judicial councils and their operation. 66
Fish attributes the creation of the judicial councils to three disparate
events. The first was the 1936 impeachment trial of District Judge
Halsted Ritter, which left many members of Congress exhausted,
irritated, and eager to explore alternative means of judicial discipline
and removal.6 7 The second was a campaign by Second Circuit Judge
Martin Manton and Fifth CircuitJudge Nathan Bryan in the mid-1930s
to separate appellate court funding from that of the Department of
Justice.68 The third and most immediate motivation for creating the
judicial councils was ChiefJustice Charles Evans Hughes's proposal to
decentralize judicial administration by creating a supervisory council in
each judicial circuit.69
Chief'Justice Hughes was especially concerned with improving the
regulation of judicial misconduct, delay, and disability.70  The
administrative structure of the Judicial Conference in place until 1939
had been criticized in congressional debates as inadequate to the
task.71 Instituted in 1922 as the Conference of Senior CircuitJudges,
the Judicial Conference drew criticism for its lack of explicit disciplin-
ary authority.72 Moreover, many saw the Conference as too central-
ized to respond sensitively and expeditiously to local problems invol-
ving individual judges.78 The individual circuit judicial conferences,
65 See Administrative Office Act, § 305, 53 Stat. at 1223.
66 See FiSH, supra note 6, at 3.
67 See id. at 153-54.
6 See id. at 110-11, 155. Until 1939, the Department of Justice oversaw the
budget and administration of the lower federal courts.
°9 See id. at 152.
70 See id. at 154-55.
71 See id. at 37.
72 See id. at 36, 235-36. This did not, however, prevent the conference from
discussing episodes ofjudicial misconduct and delay that came to its attention. See
id. at 56-57.
73 See id. at 36-37.
262 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:243
informally assembled in some circuits as early as 1924,74 were
obviously decentralized, but had no statutory authority whatsoever, let
alone the authority to administer discipline.75 With no individual or
entity in possession of explicit disciplinary authority, the chief justice
and chief circuit judges were reduced to "wheedling," and the judicial
conference to making only suggestions and recommendations.
Targeted judges could and occasionally would ignore these mild
injunctions, apparently without fear of reprisal.7 6
"To the end that the work of the district courts shall be effectively
and expeditiously transacted," declared the 1939 Act, "it shall be the
duty of the senior circuit judge of each circuit to call ... a council
composed of the circuit judges for such circuit."77  That section
further provided that "[i]t shall be the duty of the district judges
promptly to carry out the directions of the council as to the administra-
tion of the business of their respective courts."
78
Although the cumulative effect of these provisions, said ChiefJudge
Kimbrough Stone, was to create in the Judicial Council the "'only...
agency with any disciplinary powers,'" 79 the nature and extent of
those powers were not specified in the statute.8 0 Judges who partici-
pated in drafting the legislation and who later testified in support of
it identified consultation, reasoned arguments, persuasion, and
publicity as the disciplinary tools available to the councils.8 1 These
74 See id. at 146-47.
75 See id. at 145-46, 151. The Administrative Office Act, in addition to creating
the judicial councils, authorized circuit judicial conferences.
kChiefJustice Taft admitted as much:
"The fate of a Chief Justice in attempting to make District and Circuit
Judges do what they are not disposed to do is a difficult one," .... His
suggestions... might go utterly unheeded which, thought the Chief'Justice,
was "a pretty good indication that I have no function to perform in the
matter of disciplining judges."
Id. at 88-89 (footnote omitted).
Similarly, Fish quotes ChiefJudge Kimbrough Stone as saying "'[n]ot even the
Judicial Conference itself ... can do more than make recommendations and
suggestions which may or may not be followed, as thejudges affected may elect.'" Id.
at 152. As discussed further in Part II.A.2., infra, however, these informal methods
of regulating judicial behavior were nevertheless quite effective overall.
77 Administrative Office Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299 § 306, 53 Stat. 1223,
1224 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. IV
1991)).78 Id.
79 FISH, supra note 6, at 152.
80 The terms of the judicial councils' authority were so general that the Eighth
CircuitJudicial Council initially concluded that the statute had not empowered it to
act in a disciplinary capacity. See id. at 400.
81 See id. at 162-63. The testimony of interested witnesses is generally recognized
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judges explicitly excluded penal sanctions from the proposed councils'
arsenal as unnecessary and counterproductive. "'You don't have to
threaten judges to get them to carry out the directions of the coun-
cils,'" stated Chief Judge John Parker, who argued that judges would
follow the suggestions of the judicial councils by virtue of the existence
rather than the exercise of disciplinary authority.8 2 As Chief Judge
Evans added, more could be accomplished "'by a diplomatic handling
of a bad situation where cooperation of the district judges is necessary
than by coercion under authority of law."
8
b. Judicial Discipline Under the Councils' General Order-Making Authority
In 1948, the Judicial Councils section of the Administrative Office
Act was amended to read that the councils "shall make all necessary
orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business
of the courts," and that "the district judges shall promptly carry into
effect all orders of the judicial council."8 4 The House Report charac-
terized this amendment as effecting a change in "phraseology," without
altering the original understanding of the councils' powers.85 This
language remained unchanged until 1980, when the Act became
effective.
Between 1939 and 1980, misbehavior and inaction of all shapes and
sizes came to the attention of the judicial councils. Instances ofjudicial
as a weak source of legislative history. See George A. Costello, Average VotingMembers
and Other "Benign Fictions": The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates
and Other Sources of Legislative Histoty, 1990 DuKE L. J. 39, 41-42, 59. "The section
relating to the circuit councils," however, "was enacted precisely as it was proposed
by theJudicial Conference." Remington, supra note 7, at 713. Moreover, the section
was "deliberately worded in broad terms in order to confer broad responsibility and
authority on the judicial councils." Emanual Celler, Foreword to REPORT ON THE
POWERS AND RESPONSIBMIS OF THEJUDICUAL COUNCILS, H.R. MIsc. DOc. No. 201,
87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at v (1961). By speaking in such broad terms, Congress
effectively delegated to the councils themselves the task of enumerating their powers.
It was, then, the chief judges who, acting collectively as the judicial conference,
drafted the legislation, and who, acting as chairs of their respectivejudicial councils,
took the lead in interpreting the legislation. Accordingly, in this instance, the
testimony of chief judges may constitute the best extratextual evidence of the
legislation's reach.
82 FISH, supra note 6, at 161-62.
83 Id. at 162 (footnote omitted).
8 Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 332, 62 Stat. 869, 902 (1948)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1988)).
8 H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A46 (1947); see also Chandler v.
Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 98-99 (1970) (affirming that the
amendment did not change the original meaning of § 332 of the Act of June 25,
1948).
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misconduct included judges who appointed relatives as court officers
or who heard cases litigated by relatives;8 6 judges who improperly
refused to disqualify themselves;8 7 judges who were suspected of
corruption; 88 judges who billed the government for questionable
expenses;8 9 and judges who were accused of being excessively
aggressive in moving cases on their dockets. 90 Instances of judicial
inaction included both judges who delayed decision-making9 ' and
judges who took extended vacations. 92  Extrajudicial misconduct
likewise appears to have been a subject ofjudicial council review.93
While the nature of the judicial misconduct and inaction confront-
ing the councils ran the gamut of problematic behavior, the circum-
stances in which the councils issued orders pursuant to § 332 were
exceedingly limited. With the notable exception of the Chandler
case, 94 the judicial councils' order-making authority was exercised
86 See FISH, supra note 6, at 401.
87 In one well known case, the court of appeals questioned DistrictJudge Willis
Ritter's impartiality and suggested that further proceedings be heard by a different
judge. See United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920,925-26 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 899 (1958). Judge Ritter refused to comply, prompting the court of appeals to
order that the case be reassigned by the circuit's chiefjudge. See United States v.
Ritter, 273 F.2d 30, 32 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 950 (1960). Problems
persisted, and the matter was pending with the judicial council when Judge Ritter
died. See FLANDERS & McDERmoy, supra note 6, at 29, n.44. Chandler concerned a
circuit council order prompted in part by Judge Chandler's refusal to disqualify
himself in two cases. See Chandler, 398 U.S. at 77-82. Other alleged misconduct was
also at issue. For an account of the judge's alleged misconduct and the judicial
council's response, see infra notes 121-33 and accompanying text.
88 See FISH, supra note 6, at 401-02.
89 See id. at 407.
90 See FLANDERS & McDERMOTT, supra note 6, at 32-33.
91 See e.g., Chandler, 398 U.S. at 74 (enforcing order ofJudicial Council of the
Tenth Circuit finding Judge Chandler unable or unwilling to discharge his duties
efficiently); In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 593 F.2d 879, 881 (9th Cir. 1979)
(denying complaint that district courtjudge did not renderjudgments with sufficient
speed); Hilbert v. Dooling, 476 F.2d 355, 357 (2d Cir. 1973) (granting petition of
mandamus forJudge Dooling to dismiss criminal indictment on grounds that Rule 4
of the Second Circuit's Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases
precludes a second indictment); FISH, supra note 6, at 401 (discussing the Fourth
Circuit Council's criticism ofJudge John Paul for delay in two cases); FLANDERS &
MCDERMOTr, supra note 6, at 32 (discussing one circuit that removed a district court
judge from the case assignment list until he resolved a case causing serious delay).
2 See, e.g., FISH, supra note 6, at 409 (citing an instance in which a district judge
in New York City took a world tour that lasted for three months).
93 In 1969, the Judicial Conference authorized the judicial councils to review
extrajudicial activities of judges where renumeration was received. See id. at 402;
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 42, 50-52 (1969).
94 See infra text accompanying notes 121-35.
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almost exclusively in response to episodes ofjudicial inaction or delay,
not misconduct. 95 The only instance of formal council action (other
than Chandler) reported by Flanders and McDermott in their investiga-
tion, was an order removing ajudge from the case assignment list until
a long delayed case was decided.96 Fish likewise reports that:
Formal orders from the council to a district court or judge are,
however, very much the exception....
When such formal orders are issued, they often relate to the
more mundane aspects of administration. Freezing a district
judge's regular docket assignments until he has decided cases
already under advisement is not uncommon .... 97
The questionnaire completed by chief circuit judges corroborates
these conclusions. Of eight disciplinary and quasi-disciplinary
mechanisms evaluated, circuit council orders were among the least
frequently used, ranking ahead of only impeachment and criminal
prosecution. 8 Furthermore, of eighty-five to ninety-two reported
instances of remedial action taken outside of the formal disciplinary
process specified in § 372(c), only seven culminated in circuit council
orders.99 Each of the five judges reporting that circuit council orders
had been issued described the conduct causing remedial action as
including delay or disability.
10 0
The infrequency of orders issued by the judicial councils may be
attributable to a variety of factors:
Councils may view formal orders as a potential threat to judicial
independence. "It is vital," declared the 1974 Report of the Judicial
Conference, "that the independence of individual members of the
judiciary to decide cases before them and to articulate their views freely
be not infringed by action of a judicial council."1 01 As discussed
below, the Chandler decision did little to reduce uncertainty surround-
9' Two qualifications are in order. First, the councils have occasionally issued
orders in response to the conduct of court personnel. See e.g., Nolan v. Judicial
Council of the Third Circuit (In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc.), 481 F.2d 41, 46-47 (3d
Cir.) (upholding council order prohibiting a lawyer from serving as bankruptcy
trustee when a client of his firm had submitted a reorganization plan in the
proceeding), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973). Second, judicial disability has
occasionally been the subject ofjudicial council orders under § 332.
96 See FLANDERS & MCDERMoTr, supra note 6, at 32.
97 FISH, supra note 6, at 418-19.
98 See infra app., question 1.
99 See infra app., question 6.100 See infra app., question 6.
101 Oliver, supra note 6, at 213 (quoting DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE 8 (1974)).
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ing the constitutional limits of the council's power to issue orders
regulating judicial conduct.1 0 2 To avoid the problem altogether, the
councils may have preferred less action to more. As one chief judge
put it: "[W]e think nothing would furnish potential critics of the
circuit council with ammunition more than would overaction.
" 103
The statute may offer insufficient guidance as to the permissible scope of
council orders. "Standing alone," wrote the court in Chandler, "§ 332 is
not a model of clarity in terms of the scope of the judicial councils'
powers .... Legislative clarification of enforcement provisions of this
statute ... [is] called for." 10 4  With § 332, Congress created an
empty vessel that it directed the judicial councils to fill. In the wake of
Chandler and the continued uncertainty surrounding the constitutional
scope of their powers, the councils may be reluctant to do so, absent
more explicit congressional guidance. The net effect is a statute
perceived as lacking real substance. "[T]he Councils," observed Chief
Judge Lumbard, "by their many failures to act have themselves
contributed to a feeling on the part of many judges that Section 332
gave the councils no real power."10 5
Some councils may be headed by chief circuit judges who are insufficiently
interested in judicial administration to encourage council orders. How active
or passive a council is turns in no small part upon its leader, the chief
circuit judge. As District Judge John Oliver observed of circuit judicial
conferences: "If a particular Chief Judge was blessed with that
exceedingly rare quality of administrative talent, excellent conferences
were held during his time. If not, the conferences were.., a waste of
judicial time so far as making any contribution to the improvement of
administration of justice ... ."106 The same is true of the judicial
councils. Fish writes: "Much depends on the chiefjudge of the circuit.
Without his leadership, council effectiveness wanes, and his outright
disinterest assures impotence."
10 7
Councils may deem it unnecessary to issue orders pursuant to § 332, given
the availability of the Act. The Act was intended to complement, not
102 See infra text accompanying notes 121-35.
103 Nolan v.Judicial Council of the Third Circuit (In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc.),
481 F.2d 41, 47 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973).
104 Chandler v.Judidal Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 85 n.6 (1970).
105 J. Edward Lumbard, The Place of the Federal Judicial Councils in the Administra-
tion of the Courts, 47 A.B.A.J. 169, 170 (1961).
106 Oliver, supra note 6, at 215.
107 FISH, supra note 6, at 405 (footnote omitted). A December 30, 1964, interview
with J. Edward Lumbard, Chief Judge of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, is
noted in support of Fish's statement. See id. at 405 n.152.
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replace the councils' general order-making authority as a remedy for
judicial misconduct and inaction,1 08 and the Illustrative Rules recog-
nize as much.10 9 Nevertheless, the infrequency of § 332 orders since
1980 suggests that such orders may have an increasingly insignificant
role to play in the disciplinary process.
Council members do not like to order their colleagues about. In 1959, the
Ninth CircuitJudicial Council formally resolved not "'to take any action
which might be construed by the district judges as an effort to crack
the whip over them,'" so as to ensure that the judge did not think
herself "just another employee taking orders from a judicial council
acting as a quasi board of directors. ' " 110 Fish argues that this resolu-
tion articulated a shared philosophy of the judicial councils, that
"provides the background against which councils have failed to act,
especially on problems involving judicial behavior.""' Moreover,
prior to 1980, the councils were composed entirely of circuit judges,
whose lack of familiarity with district court practice may have contribut-
ed to their reluctance to take formal action against district judges.112
Even with district judges present on the councils, concerns may linger.
As one chiefjudge explained to Barr and Willging:
108 The Act was designed to strengthen the councils' power to remedy judicial
misconduct and inaction pursuant to their § 332 authority to issue orders. See
Remington, supra note 7, at 725. Section 332 was amended by substituting the phrase
"administration of justice" for "administration of the business of the courts." Id.
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1976)). One purpose of this change was to expand the
councils' authority to reach judicial discipline and disability. See Remington, supra
note 7, at 726 n.162.
109 See ILLUSTRATIvE RULES, sura note 24, Rules 2, 20. Injustifying the Rule 2
requirement that § 372(c) complaints be signed and verified, the accompanying
commentary explains:
[C]hiefjudges, as chairmen of the circuit judicial councils, can,just as they
always have, consider information from any source, anonymous or
otherwise. This solution is consistent with congressional expressions of
intention that informal methods of resolving problems, traditionally used
under section 332, should continue to be used in many cases.
Id. Rule 2 commentary at 11.
110 FISH, supra note 6, at 406-07 (quoting a 1959 resolution of the Ninth Circuit
Judicial Council).
111 FISH, supra note 6, at 407.
112 SeeJohn Biggs,Jr., Some Observations on Judicial Administration, 29 F.R.D. 464,
469 (1961) ("It was the opinion of some members of the Committee on Court
Administration that one of the reasons why the Judicial Councils of the Circuits had
not functioned more adequatelyin the past was because there were no districtjudges
on the Councils."); Oliver, supra note 6, at 210 ("[I]t is extremely difficult to expect
an appellate judge to make directions about the conduct of the business of a trial
court with which he is generally unfamiliar .... ).
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I never took it to the judicial council, that's self-defeating. If the
ChiefJudge invokes the judicial council, none of the districtjudges
likes it. You create more problems than you solve, the hostility of
the district court, and the ChiefJudge of the district court, against
the court of appeals."
5
Councils may find informal persuasion to be more effective than formal
orders. As ChiefJudge Charles Clark put it: judges cannot "'be bossed
around-they respond to more delicate handling.'" 1 4  "[F]ormal
orders issuing as lofty commands from Olympus" are therefore seen as
a remedy of last resort.1' 5 In contrast, a simple visit from the chief
judge may prove highly effective in persuading a miscreant judge to
change his or her behavior. 1 6 As one chief judge told Barr and
Willging: "Informal processes sometimes take a while, but work better.
You could never get the judicial council to go in one direction to solve
such a problem unless the Chief Judge had already done all he could
informally."117  The chief circuit judge questionnaire arguably
supports a different conclusion. Asked to appraise the value of eight
disciplinary mechanisms in terms of their general deterrent value, chief
circuit judges viewedjudicial council actions under § 332 and informal
actions of peer judges as equally significant."l 8  The question,
though, asked for an assessment of deterrent effect, not remedial
effectiveness.
Formal orders are unlikely to succeed where informal methods of
persuasion fail. Despite the chief circuit judge's best informal efforts
to wheedle, shame, or threaten a judge into amending her ways,
occasionally such efforts will prove unavailing. Judges unmoved by
informal overtures (which can include threats of formal
113 See supra note 45.
114 FISH, supra note 6, at 413 (quoting a letter from Charles E. Clark, Chief'Judge
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, to Richard A. Merrill (Apr. 5, 1963)).
115 Federal Judges and Courts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciay, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 411 (1969)
(statement of Clement F. Haynsworth,Jr., Chief'Judge of the Fourth Circuit); see also
Lumbard, supra note 105, at 169 ("Those who comprise the councils must do the
work by example, leadership, and persuasion. The making of orders and their
publication should be the last resort, rather than the first.").
116 See FLANDERS & McDERMoTr, supra note 6, at 28-29 ("[It is in the area of
handling complaints aboutjudge behavior that the councils have been most effective
.... The action taken was almost always informal. Despite considerable probing, we
uncovered no clear instances in which councils had failed to act effectively.... ."); see
also infra part II.A.2.
117 See supra note 45.
118 See infra app., question 2.
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council action1 19) may not be stirred by a council order, either. As
District Judge Mell G. Underwood remarked in reaction to a judicial
council resolution urging his retirement: "They have no authority to
remove me, and they've found that out. I told them to go to hell
"120
Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit12 1 illustrates, if not
contributes to, the thicket of factors impeding the judicial councils'
exercise of their general order-making authority.1 22 Judge Stephen
Chandler was the Chief Judge of the Western District of Oklahoma
from 1956 to 1969. By 1965, Judge Chandler's docket was backlogged,
he had been named as a defendant in civil and criminal cases, and he
had been issued writs of mandamus twice for failing to disqualify
himself from hearing cases where he had an alleged bias toward one of
the parties.12
3
In December 1965, the judicial council ordered that Judge
Chandler be given no new cases and that his pending cases be
reassigned.124 In light of a subsequent agreement among all judges
in the district, includingJudge Chandler, the council modified its order
in February 1966, to permit him to retain his pending cases.1 25
Judge Chandler then retracted his acquiescence and filed a motion with
the Supreme Court for leave to file a writ of mandamus or prohibition
challenging the judicial council's constitutional authority to issue the
order.12
6
A threshold question before the Supreme Court was whether the
Court had jurisdiction to hear Chandler's petition. 12 7 The answer
turned on whether the council order constitutedjudicial or administra-
tive action: if judicial action, hearing the petition would be a proper
exercise of the Court's appellate jurisdiction; if administrative action,
hearing the petition would require the Court to exercise original
jurisdiction, which it lacked.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a four-member majority, hinted
that the council's action might well be administrative in character,128
119 See FISH, supra note 6, at 419-20.
120 Jack E. Frankel, The CaseforJudicialDisciplinary Measures, 49J. AM.JuDICATURE
Soc'y 218, 223 (1966).
121 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
122 See id. at 84-89.
123 See id.; see also WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 6, at 39 (describing Chandler's
history as ajudge).
124 See Chandler, 398 U.S. at 78.
125 See id. at 79-80.
126 See id. at 86-89.
127 See id. at 86.
128 See id. at 86 n.7. ChiefJustice Burger wrote:
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but declined to reach the issue. Instead, the Court denied Chandler's
motion because his petition was premature. Even if it had jurisdiction,
the Court reasoned, the petition should be denied because a less
extreme remedy remained available: Chandler could still request the
council to modify its order in light of his retracted acquiescence. 29
The three remaining justices who heard the case concluded that the
council order was judicial action susceptible to Supreme Court review
in a mandamus proceeding. The three disagreed, however, as to how
the petition should be decided. Justice Harlan, concurring in the
denial of the writ, argued that the council had acted lawfully and that
the petition should be denied. 30 Justices Douglas and Black dissent-
ed, arguing that the Council's order unconstitutionally encroached
upon judicial independence and that the petition should be grant-
ed.131
In the end, Chandler provides little guidance as to the permissible
scope of judicial council orders. Whether judges aggrieved by such
orders may obtain judicial review remains an open question, 3 2 as
does whether the councils may petition for a writ of mandamus to
compel unwilling judges to comply with council orders. 3 3
Chandler may, however, help to explain why the judicial councils
might not resort to formal orders, even after informal efforts to resolve
problems fail: a recalcitrant judge who is unresponsive to private
chiding and informal threats may be no more responsive to a formal
order, and five years and two trips to the Supreme Court later, the
council may be back where it started. The lesson from the council's
We find nothing in the legislative history to suggest that the Judicial
Council was intended to be anything other than an administrative body
functioning in a very limited area in a narrow sense as a 'board of directors'
for the circuit. Whether that characterization is valid or not, we find no
indication that Congress intended to or did vest traditionaljudicial powers
in the Councils.
Id.
129 See id. at 87-89.
'30 See id. at 89 (Harlan, J., concurring in denial of the writ).
131 See id. at 129 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 141 (Black, J., dissenting).
132 If, however, a district court issues an order that draws its substance from a
judicial council directive, the judicial council's action maybe reviewable by the circuit
court in the context of an appeal from the district judge's order. Thus, in Nolan v.
Judicial Council of the Third Circuit (In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc.), 481 F.2d 41 (3d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973), a district court order removing a
bankruptcy trustee, as required by thejudicial council, was remanded for reconsidera-
tion by the court of appeals on the grounds that the judicial council's action was
invalid. See id. at 49.
133 FISH, supra note 6, at 425.
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perspective may be that orders are rarely worth the headache. Indeed,
Flanders and McDermott report that Judge Ritter13 4 escaped council
action because he was in the same circuit as Judge Chandler, and that
the council "was hesitant to take another forceful action after a
perceived failure in the Chandler case."
13 5
In short, the judicial councils' general authority to issue necessary
and appropriate orders is rarely exercised as a means to regulate
judicial misconduct and inaction. The possible explanations for this
inaction are many and varied. The fact that orders are infrequently
issued under § 332, however, does not necessarily mean that the statute
serves no purpose. As explained in Part II.A.2, the very existence of
the statute may give chiefjudges additional leverage needed to remedy
misbehavior informally.
2. The Judicial Council's Authority to Certify ajudge as
Disabled
Under 28 U.S.C. § 372(a), a judge or justice who becomes
permanently disabled may retire and receive the salary of the office if
she has served at least ten years, or half the salary of the office if she
has served less than ten years. Should a permanently disabled district
or circuit judge not retire pursuant to § 372(a), 28 U.S.C. § 372(b)
provides that the judge may be certified as disabled by a majority of the
circuit judicial council. If the President agrees with the council, he or
she may appoint an additional judge (with Senate confirmation) to the
affected district or circuit. The disabledjudge is not removed upon the
appointment of the new judge, but is treated as junior in commission.
The vacancy later created by the death, retirement, or resignation of
the disabled judge is not filled.
This procedure for addressing the problem of the disabled judge
has been in place since 1957, but the problem itself has been the
subject of numerous pieces of legislation dating back to 1801.136
What to do with an allegedly senile, mentally ill, or otherwise disabled
judge is an understandably difficult issue that requires Congress to
balance the conflicting interests of protecting the judicial system from
134 See infra text accompanying notes 256-71.
135 FLANDERS & MCDERMoTT, supra note 6, at 29 n.44.
136 The chronological summary ofjudidal disability and retirement legislation that
follows owes much to the research talents of Eric Laumann, who compiled many of
the citations referenced here. See Memorandum from Eric Laumann to Professor
Stephen Burbank (Aug. 4, 1989) (describing research done while Laumann was a
student at the University of Pennsylvania Law School) (on file with author).
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the disabled judge, insulating the nondisabled judge from politically
motivated efforts at neutralization, and preserving the dignity of the
now-disabled judge who may have served the judiciary long and well.
The history ofjudicial disability and retirement legislation reflects the
struggle between these competing concerns.
In 1801, judicial reform legislation included this provision:
That in the case of the inability of the district judge ... to
perform the duties of his office, and satisfactory evidence thereof
being shown to the circuit court, in and for such district, it shall
be the duty of such circuit court.., to direct one of the judges of
said circuit court, to perform the duties of such district judge...
for and during the period the inability of the district judge shall
continue.1
3 7
Professor Raoul Berger argues that this legislation is precedent for
legislative authority to provide for the removal of disabled judges by
means other than impeachment. 138 Berger notes that the 1801 Act
was employed to "relieve" Judge John Pickering, and that his
impeachment became necessary only after repeal of the Act in
1802.'1 9
In 1809, a new disability statute was enacted. Like the 1801 Act,
it relieved disabled judges of all judicial duties for the duration of their
disability.' 40 It also elaborated upon the procedure to be followed:
first, evidence of disability was submitted in an application of the U.S.
Marshal or District Attorney to the Supreme Court justice with
supervisory responsibility over the affected district; then, if a determi-
nation of disability was made, it was to be announced in local
newspapers at least thirty days before the new court held session.
Another disability statute was enacted in 1850.141 This variation
on prior practice shifted responsibility for initiating the process from
the U.S. Marshal or District Attorney to the clerk of court, who would
certify the existence of the disability to the circuit judge. The circuit
137 Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 25, 2 Stat. 89, 97.
13 8 See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTrrurIONAL PROBLEMS 189
(1973).139 Id. at 183 n.l1 (quoting 3 J.B. MCMASTER, HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES 166 (1892)).
140 See Act of Mar. 2, 1809, ch. 27, 2 Stat. 534. The Act provided that a substitute
judge hear "all actions, suits, causes, pleas, or processes, civil or criminal, of what
nature or kind soever, that may be depending in said district court and undeter-
mined," as well as "all suits of what nature or kind soever, which may thereafter be
brought .... " Id. at 535.
141 See Act ofJuly 29, 1850, ch. 30, 9 Stat. 442.
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judge was then authorized-but not required, as in predecessor
statutes-to designate any districtjudge within the circuit to "discharge
all the judicial duties" 142 of the disabled judge for the duration of the
disability. The same procedure was made applicable to disabled circuit
judges, whose disability was to be certified to the Chief Justice.
The 1850 legislation, as introduced in the Senate, also included a
provision giving the President the authority to appoint substitute
judges-an approach similar to that ultimately enacted in 1919 and
retained in current law. The 1850 bill providing for presidential
appointment of substitute judges was effectively deleted on the Senate
floor.143 A comparable provision in a bill introduced in the House
in 1869 was again rejected. 144
Congress made no significant changes in the judicial disability
procedure for the next seventy years. 14 5 In 1919, the precursor to
the current disability and retirement statute was enacted.1 46 Like
§ 372(b), it gave the President the power to appoint a new judge when
a sitting judge became disabled, and provided that the vacancy later
created by the death, resignation, or retirement of the disabled judge
would go unfilled. And like § 372(b), but unlike the 1801, 1809, and
1850 Acts, the 1919 legislation did not relieve the disabled judge of all
judicial duties. Instead, the disabled judge was to be "treated as if
junior in commission to the remaining judges of said court."147 To
go further, argued the sponsors of the legislation, would be unconstitu-
tional:
It is not within the power of the Congress or of the President to
displace ajudge if once appointed. He is there for good behavior,
or life, practically, and he can not be removed from office; and all
142 Id.
143 See CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 898 (1850).
144 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 219 (1869).
145 Congress did, however, adopt a few minor changes to judicial disability
procedure. In 1863, "thejudge of the supreme court for any circuit" was authorized
to name a substitute judge for himself for purposes of conducting circuit court
proceedings, should the supreme courtjudge be disabled, absent, have a conflict of
interest or otherwise need additional assistance. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 93, 12 Stat.
768, 768. In 1876, private legislation was passed authorizing a disabled judge to
"resign," notwithstanding that he had not reached the minimum retirement age of 70.
Act of June 2, 1876, ch. 119, 19 Stat. 57, 57. And in 1907, the chief justice was
authorized to designate a districtjudge from another circuit to perform the duties of
a disabled district judge (the 1850 law had limited the designations to district judges
within the circuit of the disabledjudge). See Act of Mar. 4, 1907, ch. 2940, 34 Stat.
1417, 1417.
146 Act of Feb. 25, 1919, ch. 29, sec. 6, § 260, 40 Stat. 1157, 1158.
147 Id. at 1158.
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that this bill attempts to do is simply to change his status as a
member of that court. Instead of his being senior in commission,
as he may possibly be, he simply becomes the junior in commis-
sion .... 148
It appears that Congress did not regard neutralization of a disabled
judge by the judiciary itself (as provided for in the 1801, 1809, and
1850 Acts) as creating a constitutional controversy, but did see
potential constitutional problems if other branches of government had
a significant role to play.
Unlike § 372(b), the 1809, or the 1850 statutes, the Act of 1919
required no certification of disability from within the ranks of the
judicial system-the decision was the President's alone to make.
Supporters argued that this posed no problem: if the President moved
to replace an able judge, the Senate would simply refuse to confirm the
replacement.149  Also, unlike § 372(b) and predecessor disability
statutes, the 1919 law targeted the aging, senile judge specifically and
not disabled judges generally. By its terms, the disability procedure
stated in the 1919 statute applied only to a judge "having so held a
commission or commissions at least ten years continuously and having
attained the age of seventy years," who did not resign or retire and who
was "unable to discharge efficiently all the duties of his office by reason
of mental or physical disability of permanent character."
150
In 1939, the predecessor to'§ 372(a) was enacted, permitting
disabled judges to retire voluntarily by certifying their disability in
writing to the chief circuit judge.' 51 As under current law, minimum
age requirements otherwise a prerequisite to receiving retirement pay
were inapplicable: a disabled judge serving ten years or more was
entitled to receive the salary she was paid at the date of retirement.
The last significant amendment to the disability retirement system
was made in 1957.152 In that year, the involuntary "retirement"
148 57 CONG. REC. 369 (1918) (statement of Rep. Steele).
149 Id. at 368-69 (statement of Rep. Steele).
1-0 40 Stat. at 1158. The scope of the 1919 statute is understandable, given that
its focus was uponjudicial retirement, resignation, and the creation of a seniorjudge
system.
151 Act of Aug. 5, 1939, ch. 433, 53 Stat. 1204, 1204. In the case of a disabled
Supreme Court justice or chief circuit judge, the disability was to be certified by the
Chief Justice.
152 Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-261, 71 Stat. 586 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 372 (1957)). In 1944, however, the 1939 Act was amended to authorize chief circuit
judges to call upon district and circuit judges who had voluntarily retired for disability
to perform whateverjudicial duties the retiredjudges were willing to undertake. See
Act of May 11, 1944, ch. 192, sec. 1, § 260, 58 Stat. 218 (amending 53 Stat. 1204).
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procedure for disability was extended to disabled judges, regardless of
age, and the signatures of a majority of the circuit judicial council
certifying the disability were required before the President could
appoint a new judge.153
As the sheer number of attempts at legislation imply, judicial
disability has posed a chronic problem for Congress. That the problem
is chronic, however, does not necessarily mean that its magnitude is
great. Reform efforts have frequently been initiated with a particular
judge in mind, whose refusal to retire or resign has become a source
of embarrassment. These isolated instances, though visible enough to
prompt legislative action, reveal little about the true extent of the
problem.
A lengthy review of personnel records by the Administrative Office
indicates that since 1957, only six judges have been involuntarily
certified as disabled by the circuit judicial councils under § 372(b).15 4
Chief circuitjudges, on the other hand, reported that twelve to thirteen
judges have been involuntarily certified as disabled since 1981. While
the discrepancy may be attributable to overcounting by survey
respondents, the inaccessibility of the relevant information suggests a
need for more systematic record keeping of judicial council orders.
The Administrative Office also reports that since 1939, only fifty-seven
judges-roughly one per year-have retired voluntarily due to dis-
ability.1 55 This figure, coupled with that of only six certifications of
disability since 1957, can be read in any of three ways: judicial
disability problems are being ignored, judicial disability rarely occurs,
or judicial disability is being addressed by means other than § 372. As
with misconduct, there is evidence to suggest that formal council action
is a remedy of last resort to address disability. Respect for the disabled
judge, sympathy for her situation, and a general preference for
persuasion rather than force have made informal efforts to convince a
judge to resign or retire the favored approach. 156
In 1948, thejudicial retirement and disability provisions were recodified under Title
28. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 17, 62 Stat. 869, 903-04 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 371-372 (1948)). Other minor revisions were made and oversights corrected in
1949, 1951, and 1954. See Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, sec. 67, § 372, 63 Stat. 89,
99; Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, sec. 39, § 371, 65 Stat. 710, 724; Act of Feb. 10,
1954, ch. 6, sec. 4, §§ 371-372, 68 Stat. 8, 12-13.
153 § 372, 71 Stat. at 586.
154 Telephone Interview with William Burchill, General Counsel to the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts (Aug. 31, 1992).
155 See id.
156 See FISH, supra note 6, at 412-17; Kaufman, supra note 6, at 708-09; see also
supra text accompanying notes 114-18.
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The councils' reluctance to resort to the certification process,
however, does not mean that disabled judges remain on the bench in
significant numbers. As discussed in the next section, informal efforts
to coax disabled judges into resignation have been quite successful.
Certification thus becomes necessary in only two situations: when a
disabled judge refuses to retire voluntarily, or when she is willing to
retire voluntarily but has not been on the bench long enough to do so
with full benefits. One chiefjudge described the latter scenario in an
interview with Barr and Willging: "Once I was on a special committee
investigating a complaint of disability against a judge. That was a
prearranged case. Thejudge lacked the length of service requirements
to voluntarily retire, but if he retired by order of the judicial council,
those requirements wouldn't apply."
15 7
The fact that only fifty-seven judges have retired voluntarily due to
disability does not necessarily belie the success of informal efforts. It
almost goes without saying that mental and physical disabilities afflict
the old to a greater extent than the young. The elderly, disabled judge
who has served fifteen or more years is eligible for conventional
retirement under § 371, and may understandably prefer that option to
publicizing his or her disability by retiring under § 372(a). That only
four of 359 complaints filed in 1991 accused ajudge of disability-with
three of those four filed in a single circuit15 8-offers at least some
confirmation that the infrequency with which judges step down
voluntarily due to disability, or are certified as disabled, does not
translate into an excessive number of disabled judges active in the
judiciary.
B. Informal Actions of the Chief Circuit Judge and the
Chief DistrictJudge
Of all the disciplinary and quasi-disciplinary mechanisms evaluated
in this report, informal actions by the chief circuit and district judges
appear to be used with the most frequency and to the greatest effect.
In the survey of chief circuit judges, respondents identified informal
actions by the chief circuit and district judges as the first and second
most frequently used of the eight disciplinary mechanisms evaluated.
Of the eighty-five to ninety-two remedial actions collectively taken by
chief circuit judges in response to informal allegations of misconduct
157 See supra note 45.
158 ADMINISTRATVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 34, at 117.
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or disability, seventy-seven to eighty included or were limited to chief
circuitjudge communications. An additional fourteen remedial actions
included or were limited to communications from other judges (often
chief district judges) made at the behest of the chief circuit judge.159
1. The Chief Circuit Judge
The role of the chief circuit judge in addressing problems of
misconduct and disability informally has been alluded to previously in
the context of discussing the circuitjudicial councils. Some commenta-
tors, such as Flanders and McDermott, made no attempt to separate
council orders from informal actions of the chief circuit judge,
choosing instead to lump the two together under the general rubric of
circuit judicial council functions authorized by § 332. Others, such as
Fish, have to some extent treated them separately.
Whether informal disciplinary actions of the chief judge are
characterized as a subset ofjudicial council operations can profoundly
affect the overall evaluation of the councils' performance. For Flanders
and McDermott, the chiefjudge was the alter ego of the council-if the
chiefjudge acted informally on a disciplinary matter, it was the council
acting also. Taking into account the "almost always informal" actions
of the chiefjudge in response to episodes of disability and misconduct,
they "uncovered no clear instances in which councils had failed to act
effectively," 160 and concluded that the councils had been "most
effective."161  In contrast, Professor Fish, who looked at formal
council responses to judicial misbehavior independently of informal
responses of the chief judge, characterized the councils as "pillars of
passivity," 16 2 and "rusty hinges of federal judicial administra-
tion."1683 Before reviewing the nature and extent of chief judges'
informal efforts to respond to judicial misbehavior, then, it may be
helpful to ascertain the source or sources of power or authority for
such efforts, in order to determine if they are properly characterized
as a subset of judicial council action pursuant to § 332.
159 See infra app., question 6.
160 FLANDERS & MCDERMOTT, supra note 6, at 29.
161 Id. at 28.
162 FISH, supra note 6, at 404.
163 Fish, Rusty Hinges, supra note 6, at 203.
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a. Sources of Power or Authority for Informal Disciplinary Actions
of Chief Circuit Judges
i. Section 332: The Judicial Council
The Illustrative Rules Governing Complaints ofJudicial Misconduct
and Disability (the "Illustrative Rules") express the generally accepted
view that § 332 authorizes the council, through the chief judge, to
employ "informal methods of resolving problems." 164 Such a view
is, however, without explicit textual foundation. Section 332 includes
six provisions relating to the chiefjudge, which authorize or direct the
judge to: (1) call council meetings;165 (2) preside at such meet-
ings; 166 (3) designate replacements for council members who retire
or resign;167 (4) excuse council members from attending meet-
ings;168 (5) submit Administrative Office reports to the council; 169
and (6) direct the issuance of subpoenas for council hearings. 170
Nowhere is the chiefjudge authorized to investigate or resolve matters
of judicial conduct on behalf of the council.
Under § 332(d)(1), the council could presumably direct the chief
judge to seek informal resolution of a particular matter, but there is
ample evidence that the chiefjudge investigates and acts upon reports
of misconduct or disability before, or without ever, consulting the
council. Thirty chief circuit judges reported collectively undertaking
a total of 141 to 152 investigations in response to informal allegations
of judicial misconduct, and taking remedial action in eighty-five to
ninety-two cases, while consulting the councils in only fifty-three to
fifty-six cases.
171
Alternatively, the council could issue a standing order authorizing
the chiefjudge to investigate and respond to reports of misconduct and
disability. There is, however, no indication that such orders are in fact
given. In the absence of an empowering order, the most that can be
said is that the authority of the chief judge may be implied by the
council's statutory structure: the statute makes the chief judge
responsible for calling and presiding at council meetings, and setting
164 ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 24, Rule 2 commentary at 11, Rule 20
commentary at 62.
165 See § 332(a)(1).
166 See § 332(a)(1)(A).
167 See § 332(a)(5).
168 See § 332(a)(6).
169 See § 332(c).
170 See § 332(d)(1).
171 See infra app., questions 5, 6.
INFORMAL JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
council agenda falls naturally within the ambit of those duties.
Investigating reports of judicial misconduct and disability for the
purpose of determining if council attention is warranted is arguably
part of the agenda-setting process; unsubstantiated reports, and
substantiated reports in which the judge in question has voluntarily
taken corrective action at the behest of the chiefjudge, are insufficient-
ly significant to merit a spot on the council agenda. The chief judge
is thus able to regulate the investigation of allegations of judicial
misconduct or disability.
ii. Custom
The derivation of informal action by chief circuit judges in
response to episodes ofjudicial misbehavior may be more firmly rooted
in tradition than a formal grant of statutory authority. Since the
inception of the union, the Chief Justice, and other Supreme Court
justices supervising the individual circuits, shouldered the burden of
responding privately to individual cases of judicial misconduct and
disability.1 72 Senior circuit judges, later renamed chief circuit judges,
did likewise, well before the judicial councils were created in 1939.173
This fact suggests that the power to monitor judicial conduct may be
inherent in the position of chief judge. The Illustrative Rules, while
citing § 332, also allude to "the historic functions of the chief judge"
in support of the chief judge's role in resolving disciplinary problems
informally.174
iii. Section 372(c): The Authority of the Chief Judge to Identify
Complaints
In 1990, the formal disciplinary process spelled out in § 372(c) was
amended to provide that the chiefjudge "may, by written order stating
reasons therefor, identify a complaint" sua sponte, and thereby trigger
the formal disciplinary process.175 This could be done "on the basis
of information available to the chief judge," and without a formal
complaint being filed.176 Thus, the Act authorizes the chief judge to
act upon reports of misbehavior coming to his or her attention
informally. By permitting, but not requiring, the chiefjudge to identify
172 See FISH, supra note 6, at 8-10.
173 See id. at 87-90.
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a complaint upon substantiating such reports, the statute effectively
authorizes the judge to pursue less formal alternatives.' 77
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, informal actions of the chief
circuitjudge will be treated here as related to, but distinct from, circuit
judicial council operations. On one hand, charges of passivity made
against the councils must be tempered by the recognition that the chief
judge is head of the council, and that informal actions on her part may
obviate the need for formal council action.1 78 On the other hand,
the chief circuit judge is more than just the head of the council; she is
also head of the circuit, and decision-maker of first resort in the formal
disciplinary process. Insofar as the chief judge may investigate and
remedyjudicial misconduct and disability independently of the council,
such action should also be examined and evaluated independently of
the council.
b. The Nature and Extent of Informal Chief Circuit Judge Action
i. Misconduct
There is a general consensus among judges, legislators, and
academics that informal action has been and remains the judiciary's
most common response to episodes of judicial misconduct. 79 The
177 See NCJDR Hearings, supra note 16, at 57-58 (testimony of Judge John C.
Godbold, Senior Circuit Judge, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals).
171 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
179 See Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit (In re Imperial "400" Nat'l
Inc.), 481 F.2d 41, 52 (3d Cir.) (Lumbard,J., dissenting) ("In almost every case the
fact that the circuit council had the power to make orders has rendered it unneces-
sary to do so in a formal way. A suggestion from the chiefjudge or one of the circuit
judges almost always has gained ready compliance."), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973);
126 CONG. REC. 28,092 (1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) ("[T]he informal,
collegial resolution of the great majority of meritorious disability or disciplinary
matters is to be the rule rather than the exception. Only in the rare case will it be
deemed necessary to invoke the formal statutory procedures and sanctions.. .. ");
FLANDERS & MCDERMOTr, supra note 6, at 29 ("[C]ouncils have taken effective action
after identifying a problem with a district or circuit judge's behavior. The action
taken was almost always informal."); U.S. COURT OFAPPEALS FORTHE NINTH CIRCUIT,
REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THEJUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DIsABILrIY ACT OF
1980 IN THE NINTHJUDICLAL CIRCurr (1987) ("[E]fforts by thejudiciary to police itself
have a genesis much older than ... § 3 7 2(c), which was adopted in 1980. Chief
circuitjudges dealt with problem judges through an informal mechanism, backed up
by the circuit council's power to enter orders if necessary under ... §332. This
mechanism was generally effective."); Fish, Rusty Hinges, supra note 6, at 227
("Persuasion affords councils their initial and often sole strategy in implementing
administrative policies. As one practitioner... put it, lifetime judges cannot 'be
bossed around-they respond to more delicate handling.' And more often than not
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chief circuit judge questionnaire corroborates this conclusion,
identifying informal actions by chief circuit judges as the most
frequently used of the eight mechanisms studied. 180 Explanations for
the popularity of this mechanism vary. One chiefjudge explained the
virtues of informal action in an interview with Barr and Willing: "The
advantage of proceeding informally is that you deal with the problem
without compromising the Article III status of the judges. You deal
with the problem while keeping the judge insulated from outside
pressures. You deal with it informally without headlines and newspa-
per stories." Said another chief judge: "It's always better to do it
informally. You get the right result without unnecessarily humiliating
or degrading anyone." Yet another judge explained:
The informal process is a teaching mode, not a disciplinary mode.
I can talk to ajudge without the judge getting defensive. I can get
real corrective action, not mere grudging changes. I see the
formal process as what I must use where I have failed in the
informal process. 181
The chief judges investigate and address a wide range of miscon-
duct, but responses to the questionnaire identify decision-making delay
most frequently. 182  Also mentioned is a range of questionable
behavior taking place in the courtroom: sleeping or appearing drunk
on the bench; excessively abusing lawyers, parties, or witnesses; making
inappropriate remarks, including but not limited to comments
reflecting racism or gender bias. Extrajudicial misconduct is also
addressed informally: sexually harassing staff or others; dating ajuror;
consorting with a defendant; living outside the judicial district;
drinking excessively at lunch; being arrested for driving under the
influence; and allegedly receiving an excessive teaching salary.
"Informal action" embraces a broad array of approaches available
to the chief judge in her efforts to rein in recalcitrant colleagues,
ranging from the subtle to the blunt. The chief judge may simply
forward a copy of the report that the chief received to the errant
judge.183 She may tell the judge in question that a given report is
this 'delicate handling' must come from the presiding judge of the court of appeals
... .") (footnote omitted); Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 283 ("[T]he most serious
judicial problems have not been initiated with a formal complaint. Often, problems
are resolved without a complaint ever being filed.").
180 See infra app., question 1.
181 Barr & Willging, supra note 9, at 137-38.
12 See infra app., question 6.
183 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 283:
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being taken seriously by the chiefjudge or the judicial council.18 4 The
chief may threaten to publicize the matter if cooperation is not
forthcoming.185 Or she may:
appeal to flattery and to institutional loyalty in the face of
congressional and judicial criticism and of threats, real and
imaginary, of remedial legislation or budgetary retaliation. And
to bolster their case, chief judges may note the deep concern of
that august body expressed at its most recent session, or urge, as
did Senior Circuit Judge Learned Hand, that a district judge
behind in his work "act on this case, because when I go to
Washington on the conference, this very matter will be mentioned,
and they will say, 'What happened here?' s18 6
Judges and other observers report that these efforts are almost
always successful. 187 The success of informal disciplinary action is
attributable to at least three factors. First, judges who are dedicated to
their work and to the judiciary as an institution, are likely to need no
more than a gentle suggestion from the chief judge to modify their
behavior. As ChiefJudge Groner observed shortly after creation of the
circuit judicial councils in 1939: "'You don't have to threaten judges
Without accepting the veracity of the allegations, the chiefjudge passed the
letter on to thejudge. A few days later, the judge called and was thankful
for the information. He had discussed it at home with his family. They
agreed he had been harsh, as he had also been harsh with them.
Id.
184 See FLANDERS & MCDERMOTT, supra note 6, at 32-33:
Another council took informal action to moderate the approach of a
judge who was severely criticized by the bar for his alleged excessive
aggressiveness in moving cases on his docket. Reportedly, no further action
was required after the circuit chiefjudge conveyed to thejudge in question
the seriousness of the bar complaints, and the concern these caused the
circuit council.
Id.
185 See FISH, supra note 6, at 162.
"Just turning the light of day on the judges probably in most instances
would be all that is required." Peer-group ostracism would do the rest. So
thought Arthur Vanderbilt, who told the Senate Judiciary Committee that
"no judge likes to have the fact that he is not abreast of his work held up to
public notice."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
186 Id. at 413-14 (footnotes omitted).
187 Informal methods of correcting misconduct are used so frequently, in large
part because they work well. See supra notes 114-18. On the other hand, as Professor
Fish emphasizes repeatedly, little could be done about the occasional, ornery judge
who refused the advice of the chiefjudge or judicial council. See FISH, supra note 6,
at 412; Fish, Rusty Hinges, supra note 6, at 228.
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to get them to carry out the directions of the councils' asserted Judge
Parker, 'they carry them out because the judges are good men, they
want to do what is right.'" 8 8 Second, as alluded to in a previous
section, judges may react more cooperatively to criticism couched as a
friendly suggestion from the chiefjudge, than to an imperious directive
of the judicial council.18 9
Third, the mere presence of more formal means for remedying
judicial misconduct provides an incentive for judges to take seriously
the informal suggestions of the chief circuit judge. When the judicial
councils were created, it was widely assumed that their formal powers
would not need to be used frequently because the very existence of
such powers would encourage the necessary compliance. 9 0 With
enactment of the formal disciplinary process in 1980, and a 1990
amendment authorizing the chief judge to identify complaints, the
incentives for recalcitrant judges to take advantage of informal
opportunities to modify their behavior became even greater. As
former ChiefJudge Godbold testified before the National Commission
on Judicial Discipline and Removal:
[The complaint procedure] changed the relationship of the chief
judge to the other judges within his circuit. Until 372C came
along, ajudge who said to ajudge within his circuit, "Look, let me
talk to you candidly. Are you having a little problem with the
bottle?" The reply probably would have been, "Mind your own
business."
But, you see, the procedure, particularly with the 1990
Amendment, gives the chief judge an opportunity to be in
communication, to investigate, and to act ....
This gives the chief judge an opportunity for informal
relationships about a whole host of matters. And any sensitive and
able chiefjudge, I think, will avail himself of this. 191
As another chiefjudge responding to the questionnaire put it, the Act
serves as a "shotgun behind the door." Twenty-two of twenty-sixjudges
expressing an opinion said that the Act has created more incentives
than disincentives for judges to respond constructively to informal
efforts by the chief circuit judge to remedy misconduct or disabili-
188 FISH, supra note 6, at 161.
189 See supra text accompanying notes 114-18.
190 See FISH, supra note 6, at 162.
191 NCJDR Hearings, supra note 16, at 57-58 (testimony of Judge John C.
Godbold).
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ty. 192 On a related note, Circuit Executive Collins Fitzpatrick reports
that
[o]ver the last several years, there have been at least nine federal
judicial officers who retired after a judicial misconduct complaint
was filed or was looming in the background. In most of these
cases, resolution would have been unlikely if the statutory judicial
misconduct complaint procedure and remedies were not avail-
able. 1
93
Chief judges responding to the survey reported a total of three
instances in which judges retired in response to informed allegations
of misconduct, and twelve to thirteen instances in which judges retired
in response to informal allegations of disability.
194
ii. Disability
The preceding discussion of misconduct applies equally to
disability. Professor Fish summarizes some of the informal techniques
employed to persuade disabled judges to retire or resign:
Chief Judge Charles Clark used an assortment of techniques to
induce three chief district judges then in their mid-80s to step
down from their administrative posts. He applied pressure on one
judge's secretary, while in another case he made "use of a sort of
high-grade blackmail," by threatening "that the Bar Association
was going to take the matter to the newspapers." The entire
proceeding is tortuous. One chief judge recalled it as being
"rather unpleasant, both for the person who goes to see the aged
judge and ... for the aged judge himself." So the Sixth Circuit
Council had discovered in the Underwood affair. But, the chief
judge declared: "We kept after him, and the largest newspaper in
Ohio with statewide circulation published some accounts concern-
ing the way he was handling his work, and he finally called me up
and said his name had been 'dragged down in the mud far
enough,' and that he would retire, and he did retire."
19 5
Informal efforts to persuade disabled judges to resign, retire, or
seek help, have also been quite successful. 196  One chief judge
192 See infra app., question 7.
193 Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 283.
194 See infra app., question 11.
195 FISH, supra note 6, at 416 (footnotes omitted).
196 See supra text accompanying notes 114-18, 183-88. Flanders and McDermott
note:
In one case, a highly respected judge was pressured into what has been
described as a very effective cure following a council threat to take action
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described the process to Barr and Willging:
[A] certain judge was losing his memory. We could not in
conscience allow the judge to take cases. There was no complaint,
no one on the outside knew of it. But we could see it in confer-
ence and at lunch. First we took the judge off everything except
pro se cases, and gave the judge strong panels on those. Then it
got worse. It took a lot of persuasion to get the judge to re-
tire.197
Other chiefjudges also told Barr and Wiliging of occasions where they
refused to certify senior judges for office support or salary increases as
a means of encouraging their retirement.
Again, as with the success in informal handling of misconduct, the
ability of chief judges to cope informally with disability problems has
been attributed to the availability of more formal procedures:
Even if a council never actually employed its formal powers,
the mere threat to cancel a judicial assignment or to certify
disability "has resulted in definite consequences in the form of
action by the intended subjects of the orders." Either order, if
issued, would have reflected on the incumbent judge's physical
and/or mental capacity. It constitutes a public vote of no
confidence in him, and is aimed directly at his pride and vani-
ty.198
2. Chief District Judge
Chief district judges play no formal disciplinary role. That they do,
however, have at least an informal disciplinary role is evidenced by the
fact that chief circuit judges identified chief district judge action as the
second most frequently used of eight disciplinary mechanisms.
199
under 28 U.S.C. § 372(b). In at least two other cases, judges with alcohol
problems took senior status early following an informal expression of
concern from the council or chiefjudge.
In at least three other cases, judges took senior status because of an
expression of council concern regarding senility or quasi-senility. In
addition, Judge Mell G. Underwood took senior status in 1966 following a
threat that the council would invoke section 372(b).
FLANDERS & MCDERMOTr, supra note 6, at 31-32 (footnotes omitted); see also
Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 283 (describing cases in which judges "whose deteriorat-
ing mental or physical health diminished theirjudicial abilities" were persuaded to
take senior status).
197 See supra note 45.
198 FISH, supra note 6, at 419 (quoting Richard H. Chambers, ChiefJudge of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals) (footnote omitted).
199 See infra app., question 1.
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Moreover, chief circuit judges reported a collective total of fourteen
occasions where they called upon chief district judges to address
particular problems.200 In their interviews with Barr and Willging,
several chief circuit judges explained that they would refer matters to
the chief district judge for informal resolution where greater knowl-
edge of and sensitivity to events within the district would be help-
ful. 2
01
III. INFORMAL DISCIPLINE AND JUDICIAL SOCIALIZATION
Judicial council orders and chief judge actions clearly encompass
actions undertaken in support ofjudicial administration, insofar as they
are designed to implement policies enabling the judiciary to dispose of
disputes justly, expeditiously and economically. Two additional devices
with disciplinary implications do not fit easily within the definition of
judicial administration: (1) appeal and mandamus, and (2) peer
influence.
Appellate court decisions are not means ofjudicial administration
per se, but are forms of judicial action; the just, expeditious and
economical operation of which is furthered by judicial administration.
Although designed to rectify erroneous judicial decision-making in
individual cases, circuit court opinions can also serve to encourage the
judge who does her job well, and to chasten the judge who does not.
Peer influence, on the other hand, is largely a social and cultural
phenomenon that is not necessarily "designed" to do anything at all,
but which may nevertheless serve as a regulator of judicial conduct.
The relevance of these two devices is that both of them regulate
judicial behavior through a subtle process ofjudicial socialization.
A. Mandamus and Appeal
Mandamus or appeal, when used simply as a means to correct a
lower court's decision on the merits, is not used for disciplinary
purposes. On occasion, however, appellate courts address conduct in
mandamus or appellate proceedings that, while possibly related to the
merits, might otherwise be subject to discipline under § 372(c). This
Section explores the situations in which mandamus and appeal have
been used in a disciplinary or quasi-disciplinary manner.
20 2
200 See infra app., question 6.
201 Barr & Willging, supra note 9, at 135.
202 To convey the disciplinary tone of the opinions discussed in this Section,
passages from the cases will be quoted at length. This survey does not purport to be
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1. Limitations on Mandamus and Reversal as Disciplinary Tools
There are several reasons why mandamus and appeal constitute
relatively weak means of addressing judicial misbehavior. First, most
errors corrected in mandamus and appellate proceedings have nothing
to do with judicial misconduct in the traditional sense of the phrase.
Judge Harry Edwards observed:
[I]t has never been assumed that mandamus or reversal are useful
tools to deal with the ongoing problems of judicial misconduct.
Mandamus and reversal are used mainly to counter the types of
"honest error" that, unless intentional or belligerent, do not call
for punishment so much as correction, or "setting straight." The
areas of "honest disagreement" that result in reversal are hardly
appropriate for sanction .... 203
Second, Judge Edwards's point remains well-taken even in cases
where a judge's error is less than honest. Mandamus and reversal are
designed to correct error, not to call the judge to task for misbehavior.
A court of appeals reluctant to chastise a colleague in a published
opinion can usually avoid the problem by focusing exclusively upon the
merits of the judge's decision or ruling. The disinclination of the
courts of appeals to criticize the judge personally is nowhere more
evident than in mandamus proceedings. Courts often express regret
that the mandamus proceeding obliges the district judge to become a
named party.20 4 Even when mandamus is granted, courts of appeals
exhaustive of relevant cases on the subject; in most instances, I have selectively
identified those cases that best illustrate the issues raised.
203 Edwards, supra note 7, at 794. Even though petitions for writs of mandamus
are granted only in extreme cases deemed to constitute a usurpation of judicial
power, or its equivalent, such petitions usually concern erroneous actions or inactions
of the district court that are closely tied to the merits of an underlying litigation. See
infra notes 204-12 and accompanying text. Thus, district courts have been ordered
to issue bench warrants, see, e.g., Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241 (1932); to
surrender a vessel in an in rem admiralty proceeding, see, e.g., Fx parte Republic of
Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) (superseded by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1607 (1988), as stated
in In re Air Crash Disaster, 716 F. Supp. 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 907
F.2d 1328 (2d Cir. 1990)); to remand a case to state court, see, e.g., Maryland v. Soper,
270 U.S. 9 (1926); to retain a case improperly remanded to state court, see, e.g., In re
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 535 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1976); to modify pretrial
procedures, see, e.g., International Business Machs. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37 (2d
Cir. 1975); to reinstate ajury verdict, see, e.g., Kanatser v. Chrysler Corp., 199 F.2d
610 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 921 (1953); to refrain from referring a case
to a master, see, e.g., La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); to refrain
from ordering production of a film, see; e.g., Goldblum v. National Broadcasting Co.,
584 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1978); and to hear motions on an indictment, see, e.g., Frankel
v. Woodrough, 7 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1925).
204 See, e.g., Kerr v. United States, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976) (stating that writs of
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occasionally go to great lengths to anesthetize the sting of their orders
by praising the district court and avoiding language that could be
construed as disciplinary in tone.
20 5
Third, mandamus standards are exacting. Traditionally, "only
exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial 'usurpation of
power'" would justify the use of mandamus. 20 6 Under this standard,
mandamus was available only when ajudge took action that she was not
empowered to take, or failed to take action that she was required to
take.207 In recent years, that standard has been relaxed. Mandamus
has been used to discourage erroneous practices and prevent their
recurrence, on the grounds that "supervisory control of the District
Courts by the Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial
administration in the federal system"2 0 8 -even though the judicial
action at issue is technically within the district judge's power ("supervi-
sory" mandamus).20 9 Similarly, mandamus may be used in an adviso-
ry capacity to resolve important questions of first impression that
would likely recur if left unresolved ("advisory" mandamus).2 10
Although the advent of supervisory and advisory mandamus increased
the authority of the courts of appeals to address judicial misconduct in
mandamus have "'the unfortunate consequence of making the [district court]judge
a litigant, obliged to obtain personal counsel or to leave his defense to one of the
litigants before him'" (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947))); Nelson v.
Grooms, 307 F.2d 76, 79 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., concurring) ("A mandamus
proceeding is an unfortunate technique. It puts ajudge in an adversary position....
[This case] ought not to be encumbered by the embarrassing predicament of
attacking a conscientious, vigorous, energetic Judge ... for non-performance of
duty.").
205 See, e.g., Edelstein, 526 F.2d at 42, 47 (granting mandamus petition, but
underscoring that "the trial judge did not intend adverse results to flow from his
rulings," that the practices at issue were merely "indicative of the high standards"
which the judge had set for the trial, and that "[t]his court has the greatest respect
for Judge Edelstein's efforts").
206 Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967) (quoting De Beers Consol. Mines,
Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945)).
207 See Note, Superoisoty and Advisory Mandamus Under the All Writs Act, 86 HARV.
L. REv. 595, 599 (1973).
208 La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. at 259-60; see also Ward, supra note 6,
at 241 ("La Buy is viewed by both courts and commentators as a precedent for
expanded appellate court supervision of lower courts.").
209 Even though the La Buy decision used the conventional "abuse of power"
language, see 352 U.S. at 256, the judicial action at issue-referring cases to a master-
was explicitly authorized by Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
issue, therefore, was not whether the judge exceeded his power in making the
references, but whether a decision he was empowered to make had been made
erroneously. See Ward, supra note 6, at 241.
210 See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 111 (1964).
INFORMAL JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
mandamus proceedings, it did not make mandamus proceedings readily
available for that purpose. As the Supreme Court observed in Allied
Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc.21 : "In short, our cases have answered
the question as to the availability of mandamus ... with the refrain:
'What, never? Well, hardly everl"
212
2. When Mandamus and Reversal Are Used as Disciplinary Tools
Notwithstanding the foregoing limitations upon mandamus as a
vehicle for judicial discipline, there are instances in which it has been
so used. Chief judges responding to the questionnaire rated manda-
mus as among the more frequently used mechanisms for judicial
discipline, placing it ahead of impeachment, criminal prosecution,
judicial council orders, and discipline under § 372(c).2 1 3 In addition,
nineteen of twenty-eight judges responding rated the deterrent effect
of mandamus significant or very significant.214 Even when manda-
mus is denied or a lower court ruling is affirmed, a comment in the
appellate opinion critical of the lower court may have the desired
admonitory effect.215 The questionnaire results offer some support
for this proposition, with seventeen of twenty-seven judges rating the
deterrent effect of "adverse comments in appellate court opinions" as
significant or very significant.
216
a. Decision-making Delay
Whether mandamus is an effective means to rectify unjustified
decision-making delay is an issue of particular importance, given that
the formal disciplinary process has generally been deemed unavailable
to remedy delay.2 17 The first and perhaps foremost problem with
211 449 U.S. 33 (1980)
212 Id. at 36. Less colorful expressions of the same sentiment litter recent
Supreme Court opinions in mandamus proceedings. See, e.g., Kerr v. United States,
426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976) (considering mandamus a drastic remedy, for use only in
extraordinary situations); Exparte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947) (stating that writs
of mandamus are extraordinary remedies "reserved for really extraordinary causes").
213 See infra app., question 1.
214 See infra app., question 2.
215 See, e.g., Hester v. NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank, 899 F.2d 361, 367 (5th Cir. 1990)
(denying mandamus, but adding that "the district court may have been wrong... not
to stay the appointment of the trustee"); Stans v. Gagliardi, 485 F.2d 1290, 1291-92
(2d Cir. 1973) (denying mandamus, but adding "we cannot agree with the judge's
view that [this] 'is a very simple case'" and that "Judge Gagliardi may again consider
the matter as we hope he will").
216 See infra app., question 2.
217 See supra part I. Note that appeal is not available as a remedy for delay,
1993]
290 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:243
mandamus petitions as the principal remedy for delay is that lawyers
are understandably reluctant to use them, for one of the same reasons
courts of appeals are reluctant to grant them: they are directed at the
judge personally, and the judge may take them personally. Alan
Morrison describes the no-win situation confronting a lawyer in such
cases:
The case is sitting there not for days or weeks but for months, and
in some cases years.
For the lawyer, the[re are] nothing but bad choices .... You
can call chambers. You can write letters. You can contact the
chief judge. You can write a letter to the administrative office.
Now, fortunately, with the Civil Justice Reform Act, there are
reports twice a year that show who the judges are who are behind,
and you can call the local newspaper and tell them to go look at
it.
But in the end, there's nothing you can do save file a petition
for a writ of mandamus. And then what does that do? It may get
you a decision, but not the one that you and your client want2 1 8
While the lawyer who files a petition in such cases may succeed in
antagonizing the district court, the lawyer who does not file a petition
may succeed in antagonizing the court of appeals. In United States v.
Boyce,2 19 for example, the district court took almost three years to
deny a criminal defendant's motions for a new trial and a judgment of
acquittal. 22 0 During the time that the motions were pending, defense
counsel called the matter to the attention of the district judge in at
least six telephone calls to the judge's chambers, and in one letter.221
Nevertheless, in reversing the district court, the court took the
opportunity to chide the defendant's lawyer:
Defense counsel's acceptance of a court appointment to represent
Boyce, who was an indigent criminal defendant, included a serious
commitment to zealously represent the best interests of his client.
In light of this extraordinary delay, we are surprised that Boyce's
counsel failed to file a petition for a writ of mandamus on behalf
of his client.222
inasmuch as appeals seek review of a lower court decision or ruling, not the absence
of such a decision or ruling.
218 NCJDR Hearings, supra note 16, at 207-08 (May 1, 1992) (testimony of Alan
Morrison, Director of the Public Citizen Litigation Group).
219 849 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1988).
220 See id. at 838.
221 See id.
222 Id. (citations omitted).
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Of the cases in which a mandamus petition has been filed to
remedy decision-making delay, most of the delays at issue do not
appear to have arisen as a result of judicial incompetence, neglect, or
malice. Many petitions have been denied on grounds that the delay
was insufficiently extreme. 22  Others-some granted, some not-have
concerned delays that were simply the result of well-intentioned efforts
by the district court to postpone decision-making pending resolution
of related proceedings, 224 or to permit extrajudicial resolution of the
litigation.22 Still other petitions-some granted, some not-concerned
delays occasioned by excessive workload. 22
6
" See, e.g., Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 666 (1978) (denying
mandamus because delay in adjudicating claim was "a product of the normal excessive
load in the District Court"). A series of recent cases in the Fourth Circuit denied
petitions for mandamus on the grounds that the delay complained of-generally six
months or less-had not been undue. See e.g., In re Artis, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
11851, at *1 (4th Cir. May 22, 1992) (denying mandamus because three-month lapse
since "recent significant action" does not constitute undue delay); In re Silvers, No.
91-8066, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 24710, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 17, 1991) (stating that four
months of inaction is insufficient basis for granting mandamus on grounds of undue
delay); In re Wilcox, No. 91-8019, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 10424, at *1 (4th Cir. May
23, 1991) (stating that there is no undue delay where complaints were last acted on
within six months); In re Reeves-Bey, No. 90-8047, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 1161, at *1
(4th Cir.Jan. 29, 1991) (stating that there is no undue delay wherejudicial attention
has been paid to a motion within the last six months).
" See, e.g., In re Blodgett, 112 S. Ct. 674, 676 (1992) (holding that the court of
appeals improperly delayed decision in habeas case, pending resolution of related
petition in district court and denying mandamus on other grounds); Will, 437 U.S.
at 655 (denying mandamus petition where federal court proceedings were delayed
pending outcome of related state proceedings); Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d
820, 834-35 (9th Cir. 1963) (granting mandamus to lift stay pending outcome of
related state proceedings); Nelson v. Grooms, 307 F.2d 76, 79 (5th Cir. 1962)
(denying mandamus petition where proceedings in school desegregation case were
stayed pending resolution of a related suit).
' See, e.g., Cheyney State College Faculty v. Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732, 738 (3d Cir.
1983) (denying mandamus petition where stay of proceedings in school desegregation
case was justified in order to permit administrative resolution); In re United States,
140 F.2d 19, 20 (5th Cir. 1943) (holding that delay in proceeding for purpose of
enabling claimant to rectify alleged statutory violation unjustified and denying
mandamus on other grounds).
26 In the words of one court granting mandamus:
The unfortunately high volume of prisoner cases pending in the District of
Kansas is insufficient to justify the delay occasioned here.
Certainly we sympathize with the district court's efforts to keep abreast
of its burgeoning case load. And, "[it is indeed unfortunate if the judicial
manpower provided by Congress in any district is insufficient to try with
reasonable promptness the cases properly filed in or removed to that court
1993]
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Even to the extent a delay is attributable to spite, neglect or
incompetence, the previously discussed stringency of mandamus
standards may result in denial. As one chief judge told Barr and
Willging in the context of a discussion of complaints relating to delay
under the Act: "Complaints occasionally raised delay, which I found
difficult. In an individual case, the rules are clear it's a no go, you file
a mandamus, even though the number of mandamuses granted is so
minuscule you're not sure how practical an alternative that is."227
There are, however, a relatively small number of cases in which the
courts of appeals have granted petitions for writs of mandamus on the
grounds of delay attributable to inappropriate judicial behavior.
Eighteen of twenty-five chief judges expressing a view stated that
mandamus petitions were a somewhat effective or very effective means
of remedying judicial neglect and unjustified delay. 228 "There can
be no doubt," opined the Court in Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance
Co.,229 "that, where a district court persistently and without reason
refuses to adjudicate a case properly before it, the court of appeals may
issue the writ 'in order that [it] may exercise the jurisdiction of review
given by law. ' "230 Thus, for example, in Hall v. West,23 ' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted the plaintiffs'
mandamus petition in a school desegregation case whose motions had
been pending with the district court for over two years.28 2 The
district court defended the action as within the discretionary authority
of a district judge to control his schedule, and as necessary to facilitate
an amiable solution to the litigation.2 8 The court of appeals was
unpersuaded:
[T]his Court feels that the response does not merit the serious
attention of the Court. It shows startling, if not shocking, lack of
Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) (quoting
Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 344 (1976)); see also In re
Maxwell, 100 F.2d 749,751 (5th Cir. 1938) (denying mandamus but admonishing that
"pressure of other business is not an excuse for further delay" and warning that an
order in the nature of mandamus would issue "[s]hould entry of final judgment be
delayed more than thirty days").
227 See supra note 45.
228 See infra app., question 13.
229 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
230 Id. at 661-62 (quoting Insurance Co. v. Comstock, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 258, 270
(1873)).
231 335 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1964).
232 See id. at 483.
23 See id. at 483-84.
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appreciation of the clear pronouncements of the Supreme Court
and this Court during the past year which make it perfectly plain
that time has run out for a district court to temporize....
•.. In this case neither the school authority nor the district
court has accepted its responsibility....
•.. The respondent has had ample admonishment, both from
the Supreme Court and this Court, as to what is required of him
in the premises. His failure to respect these admonishments
makes it reasonably clear that an order from us directing merely
that he enter a judgment in the case would mean simply that the
case would be back here again.... Such further delay and such
further consumption of judicial time is not only unnecessary but
it would tend to destroy the confidence of litigants in our judicial
system.
The mandamus absolutely will, therefore, [be granted]. 23 4
In a number of cases, the courts of appeals have pointedly rejected
claims of crowded dockets in defense of delayed decision-making. In
Jones v. Shell,235 the Eighth Circuit granted a mandamus petition with
the following explanation:
We find a flagrant violation of our mandate ofJanuary 13, 1977,
by the district court in failing to act within a reasonable time upon
this court's order of [reversal]. The writ of habeas corpus,
challenging illegality of detention, is reduced to a sham if the trial
courts do not act within a reasonable time.... Busy court dockets
cannot justify a 14-month delay in processing this claim from the
date of remand. Petitioner has been seeking relief since March of
1976. We find this delay has denied petitioner constitutional due
process.23 6
Similarly, in McClellan v. Young,23 7 the Sixth Circuit granted a manda-
mus petition, rejecting the district court's explanation that the delay
was attributable to "an unusually crowded docket," and stating: "We
are fully appreciative of the problems of the District Judge but in much
less time than we believe was consumed in the preparation and filing
of his motion to dismiss.., he could have ruled on petitioner's habeas
234 Id. at 484-85.
235 572 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1978)
216 Id. at 1280 (footnote omitted).
237 421 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1970).
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corpus petition .... "238 In United States v. Boyce,239 a mandamus
petition was never filed, but a delayed order denying motions for a new
trial and an acquittal was reversed by the Third Circuit. The court
stated:
[I]t is with extreme consternation that we observe that the district
court took almost three full years to deny Boyce's post-trial motions
Nothing in the record before us even hints at a reasonable
explanation for this unconscionable delay. Conceivably, this
matter might have slipped through the cracks of the district court's
docket which is unquestionably burdened by the weight of a heavy
case load....
Regrettably, we cannot ignore that the ultimate responsibility
for this unjust delay rests on the shoulders of the district judge
.... The injustice inflicted by judicial delay of this magnitude is
intolerable. 240
And in In re Funkhouser,241 the Eighth Circuit "deem[ed] it extraordi-
nary" that a magistrate delayed almost seventeen months in ruling on
a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and granted the writ,
rejecting the magistrate's explanation that there had been numerous
filings by state prisoners in the district.
242
The overall effectiveness of mandamus as a remedy for decision-
making delay is debatable. It does, of course, end delays in cases
where mandamus petitions are filed and granted; on the other hand,
it does nothing in cases where litigants are unwilling to file petitions.
And to the extent mandamus petitions are granted carefully to avoid
the impression that they have a disciplinary purpose, delays which
deserve to be characterized as the product of inappropriate judicial
behavior may be ended without "discipline." The net effect may be, as
one chiefjudge described it to Barr and Willging: "You issue the usual
order, say mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, you are confident the
judge will take care of the matter in the immediate future. Invariably
the judge will take care of that case, but not the other 999 cases." 248
2
-
8 Id. at 691.
239 849 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1988).
240 Id. at 838-39.
241 873 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1989).
242 Id. at 1077-78.
243 See supra note 45.
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b. Bias and Conflict of Interest
A litigant's right to have her case heard before an impartial judge
is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and
sections 144 and 455 of title 28 of the U.S. Code. These constitutional
and statutory provisions enable litigants to request that a judge recuse
herself on grounds of bias or conflict of interest. District court orders
denying such requests may be reviewed on appeal or in mandamus
proceedings. Because remedies are in place to address bias and
conflicts of interest, chief judges have dismissed complaints of such
conduct filed under the Act on the grounds that they are related to the
merits of a matter that was or should have been raised and resolved in
the underlying litigation.
244
By its terms, § 144 empowers a litigant to disqualify a judge by
filing a "timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the
matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him
or in favor of any adverse party."2 45  Section 455(a), in contrast,
directs a judge to disqualify herself from "any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned,"246 while § 455(b)
requires disqualification in certain specific circumstances. 247
Although the text of sections 144 and 455 appears to create a
relaxed standard for disqualification that would be relatively easy to
satisfy,judicial construction has limited the statutes' application, so that
recusal is rare, and reversal of a district court's refusal to recuse is even
rarer. First, the courts have counterbalanced the need to preserve the
appearance of impartiality, with the judges' obligation not to recuse
themselves except where absolutely necessary.248 Second, the courts
have limited the scope of evidence demonstrative of bias: this evidence
may not be based on attitudes formed by the judge in light of her
experience with the litigants in present or past proceedings; 249 on
244 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
245 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988).
246 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988).
247 Such circumstances include: where the judge has a personal bias; where the
judge or his former firm served as counsel in the matter when the judge was in
practice; where the judge has a financial interest in the matter; and where the judge
is related to a party, lawyer, witness or someone with a financial interest in the
matter. See § 455(b)(1)-(5).248 Many courts have spoken in terms of the judge's duty to sit when disqualifica-
tion is not warranted as being as great as the duty not to sit when disqualification is
warranted. See United States v. Bray, 546 F.2d 851, 857 (10th Cir. 1976); Rosen v.
Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 797 (2d Cir. 1966); In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381,
391 (1st Cir. 1961); Tucker v. Kerner, 186 F.2d 79, 85 (7th Cir. 1950); Grand
Entertainment Group, Ltd. v. Arazy, 676 F. Supp. 616, 619 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
249 See e.g., Easley v. University of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 906 F.2d 1143, 1146-47
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attitudes expressed in the judge's prior opinions or rulings;250 or on
the judge's activities or views expressed prior to ascending the
bench. 25 1 Evidence of bias against a lawyer, rather than a party, may
likewise be insufficient.252 Third, some circuits have denied petitions
for mandamus challenging ajudge's refusal to disqualify herself, on the
grounds that the issue is properly resolved only on appeal. 253 At the
same time, at least one circuit has rejected appeals challenging the
judge's refusal to disqualify herself, on the grounds that the issue is
properly resolved only in a petition for mandamus.
2 54
Notwithstanding the gauntlet of impediments to recusal under
sections 144 and 455, courts of appeals have occasionally ordered the
disqualification ofjudges with biases or conflicts of interest too obvious
to ignore.255 Two of the best known series of cases have concerned
(6th Cir. 1990) (upholding judge's refusal to recuse despite the fact that the judge
graduated from the law school that was a party in the action); United States v.
Pritchard, 875 F.2d 789, 791 (10th Cir. 1989) (upholding judge's refusal to recuse
despite the judge's prior judicial contacts with defendant); Securities Exch. Comm'n
v. Drexel Burnham, Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.), 861 F.2d 1307, 1316
(2d Cir. 1988) (upholding judge's refusal to recuse despite criticism of defense
counsel and the judge's wife's interest in the sale of the business in which the
defendant is litigating the action).
M See, e.g., United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 131, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(upholding ajudge's refusal to recuse despite the defendant's claim that the opinions
expressed by the judge while the judge presided over the defendant's criminal
proceedings created bias); Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense Comm. v. FBI, 507
F.2d 1281, 1285 (8th Cir. 1974) (upholding ajudge's refusal to recuse despite the
defendant's claim that the judge had personal bias against the defendant from dealing
with the defendant in other criminal cases).
21 See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 839 (1972) (denying a motion for a
justice to recuse himself om grounds that his past decisions as an employee of the
executive branch created no bias).
252 See, e.g., Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390, 1398-99 (8th Cir. 1983)
(upholding ajudge's refusal to recuse despite claims of extrajudicial bias against the
attorney of one of the parties); Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052
(5th Cir. 1975) (upholdingjudge's refusal to recuse despite claims of extrajudicial bias
against the attorney of one of the parties).
2,3 See In re City of Detroit, 828 F.2d 1160, 1166 (6th Cir. 1987); City of Cleveland
v. Krupansky, 619 F.2d 576, 578-79 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980); Green
v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591, 594 (3d Cir. 1958).
254 See United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1367 (7th Cir. 1991); Taylor v.
O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 1201 (7th Cir. 1989).
25 Cases ordering disqualification because of bias include: Johnson v. Mississippi,
403 U.S. 212,215-16 (1971) (disqualifyingjudge because of revealed bias against civil
rights workers); Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 28-36 (1921) (disqualifyingjudge
because of bias against American citizens of German ancestry); United States v.
Holland, 655 F.2d 44,47 (5th Cir. 1981) (disqualifyingjudge because of revealed bias
against the defendant); Roberts v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125, 128-30 (6th Cir. 1980)
(disqualifyingjudge because of the judge's friendship with the plaintiff); Nicodemus
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judges whose biases were not necessarily extrajudicial in origin, but
were sufficiently extreme to cause the appellate courts to ignore the
general rule excluding such evidence from consideration.
One series of cases, involving Chief Judge Willis Ritter, in the
District of Utah, spanned nearly two decades.2 56  In the 1955 deci-
sion of United States v. Hatahley,2 57 the court of appeals reversed
Judge Ritter's judgment charging the United States with unauthorized
destruction of the plaintiffs' horses and burros and observed that the
case "was tried in an atmosphere of maximum emotion and a minimum
of judicial impartiality."2 5 8 The Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded for new proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion.
259
Following retrial, the court of appeals reversed Judge Ritter again:
A casual reading of the two records leaves no room for doubt that
the District Judge was incensed and embittered, perhaps under-
standably so, by the general treatment over a period of years of
the plaintiffs and other [Native Americans] in southeastern Utah
by the government agents .... From his obvious interest in the
case ... we are certain that the feeling of the presiding Judge is
such that, upon retrial, he cannot give the calm, impartial
consideration which is necessary for a fair disposition of this
unfortunate matter, and he should step aside.
v. Chrysler Corp., 596 F.2d 152, 156-57 (6th Cir. 1979) (disqualifying judge because
of statements made against the defendant); United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527,
527 (3d Cir. 1973) (disqualifyingjudge for statement that it was his policy to sentence
selective service violators to 30 months if they were "good people"); Occidental
Petroleum Corp. v. Chandler, 303 F.2d 55, 57 (10th Cir. 1962) (disqualifyingjudge
because of actions taken in court against defendant that demonstrated bias); Connelly
v. United States Dist. Court, 191 F.2d 692, 696-97 (9th Cir. 1951) (disqualifyingjudge
because judge's remarks during trial demonstrated hostility toward the plaintiff);
Whitaker v. McLean, 118 F.2d 596,596 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (disqualifyingjudge because
of admitted bias against Communists).
Cases ordering disqualification because of conflict of interest include: Moody
v. Simmons, 858 F.2d 137, 139-43 (3d Cir. 1988) (disqualifying ajudge because his
daughter was employed by one of the parties in the action that he was presiding over
and because he was represented by the defendant's law firm in a personal injury
action); Texaco, Inc., v. Chandler, 354 F.2d 655, 657 (10th Cir. 1965) (disqualifying
judge because the plaintiff's attorney was representing him in another action); Rapp
v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 813-14 (3d Cir. 1965) (disqualifying judge because he
had previously employed the defendants' counsel).
2 Judge Ritter is the focus of an article by attorney Brent Ward, analyzing the
effectiveness of mandamus as a means ofjudidal administration. See Ward, supra
note 6, at 233-36.
257 220 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1955).
258 Id. at 670.
259 See Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 180-82 (1956).
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[W]e suggest that when the case is remanded to the District
Court, the Judge who entered the judgment take appropriate
preliminary steps to the end that further proceedings in the case
be had before another Judge.
260
Upon remand, Judge Ritter announced that he did not "intend to
follow" the court of appeals' suggestion that he step aside,261 where-
upon the United States petitioned the Tenth Circuit for a writ of
mandamus. 262 The writ was granted.
263
In 1976, the court of appeals granted another mandamus petition
seeking the disqualification of Judge Ritter.264  The judge had
become noticeably warmer to defense counsel and colder to govern-
ment counsel midway through an antitrust proceeding, beginning at the
point the judge first became aware that defense counsel, in the
counsel's capacity as president of the state bar, had opposed six bar
resolutions objecting to Judge Ritter's behavior in other cases. 265
The court of appeals wrote:
The final question, and that which disturbs us most, is whether
in the light of the total facts and viewing the future of this case in
the light of Section 455(a), there exists a reasonable likelihood that
the cause will be tried with the impartiality that litigants have a
right to expect in a United States district court. Unfortunately, we
cannot predict that it will be.
266
The following year the Tenth Circuit reversed a directed verdict by
Judge Ritter for the plaintiff in a contract dispute in which a basketball
team sued its former coach. 267 Although the basis for reversal was
that the facts as adduced at trial did not support the directed verdict,
the court felt compelled to comment on Judge Ritter's demeanor:
In the circumstances, it is not necessary for us to discuss the
defendants' claims of many errors based on admission and
rejection of evidence and on restriction of cross-examination. It
is enough to say that the trial was not conducted in an impartial
260 United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 925-26 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 899 (1958).




264 United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459, 464 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 951
(1976).
265 See id. at 460-61.
266 Id.
267 See Eckles v. Sharman, 548 F.2d 905, 909 (10th Cir. 1977).
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manner. In a new trial, judicial conduct similar to that appearing
in the record before us, hopefully, will not be repeated.
... The conduct of the trial by Judge Ritter indicates that he
has a strong personal bias and prejudice incompatible "with the
impartiality that litigants have a right to expect in a United States
district court."26
8
In the same year that Eckles was decided, the court of appeals
reversed Judge Ritter again in Webbe v. McGhie Land Title Co. :269
Here, the trial judge, without reading the depositions, and based
on the oral argument of counsel for Webbe and Kitt, announced
that the insurance company was "stuck" before even permitting
counsel for the insurance company to address the court. To us
there is not a reasonable likelihood that the trial judge in the
instant case, having now been reversed for granting summary
judgment, could later preside over the trial of this matter in a fair
and impartial manner .... 270
In the fall of 1977, the United States took the unprecedented step
of petitioning the Tenth Circuit for a writ of mandamus barringJudge
Ritter from hearing any case in which the United States was a party.
By way of explanation, the petition alleged that:
[Judge Ritter] invents and follows his own rules, is swayed by his
own preconceptions of legal procedure, and is determined that no
outside force-not the arguments of counsel, not the holdings of
this Court-shall interfere with the conduct of his court. He feels
no responsibility to the litigants to explain or justify his decisions.
He brooks no argument and does not tolerate even well-mannered
opposition to his views. He attempts to make his decisions in such
a way that this Court will be unable to correct his errors.27 1
Judge Ritter died before the petition was decided.
A second series of cases involved Judge Miles Lord of the District
268 Id. at 910-11 (quoting United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459, 464 (10th Cir.
1976)).
269 549 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1977).
270 Id. at 1361.
271 Ward, supra note 6, at 234 (quoting Petition of the United States for Writ of
Mandamus or Prohibition at 2-3, United States v. Ritter (10th Cir.) (No. 77-1829),
dismissed as moot, Aug. 11, 1978).
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of Minnesota.2 72 In the 1972 decision of Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord,2 73 the
court of appeals denied a mandamus petition seeking Judge Lord's
recusal on grounds of bias, but also admonished the judge:
This record adversely reflects upon Judge Lord's conduct during
the pretrial proceedings. Reluctantly, we have pointed out his
shortcomings in this case. We demand ofJudge Lord, as we do of
every trial judge in this circuit, a high standard of judicial
performance with particular emphasis upon conducting litigation
with scrupulous fairness and impartiality.
274
Four years later, in Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord,275 the Eighth
Circuit granted a petition seeking Judge Lord's recusal:
Ordinarily, when unfair judicial procedures result in a denial of
due process, this court could simply find error, reverse and
remand the matter. Recusal would be altogether inappropriate.
However, the record in this case demonstrates more serious
problems. The denial of fair procedures here was due not to good
faith mistakes of judgment or misapplication of the proper rules
of law by the district court. The record demonstrates overt acts by
the district judge reflecting great bias against Reserve Mining
Company and substantial disregard for the mandate of this
court.
276
In 1983, the court of appeals reversed the convictions of five
defendants in United States v. Singer,277 due to apparent bias on the
part of Judge Lord:
While he undoubtedly thought that by aiding and correcting the
government attorney, he was merely redressing the balance
between several reputable defense lawyers and one "overwhelmed"
government attorney, the obvious effects were 1) to place the
defense at a disadvantage in the eyes of the jury by casting the
prosecutor in the role of an underdog... and 2) to suggest to the
jury that he favored the government's position.2 78
272 An article by former Professor Carol Rieger evaluates the effectiveness of the
discipline statute, with particular reference to judge Lord. See generally Rieger, supra
note 4.
273 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972).
274 Id. at 544.
275 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976).
276 Id. at 185.
277 710 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1983).
278 Id. at 436 (citations omitted).
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Chief Judge Donald Lay was bolder in his concurrence: "Once the
judge assumes the mantle of an advocate the balance of fair process
becomes imbalanced and the proceeding becomes inquisitorial in kind.
The fair and respected judge is one who becomes detached from the
outcome and allows the chips to fall where they may."2
79
The following year, in Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co.,280 a Dalkon
Shield case, the Eighth Circuit ordered stricken from the recordJudge
Lord's condemnation and reprimand of the defendant corporation's
officers.2 8 1 The officers, who were not parties to the litigation, were
chastised by Judge Lord for their role in bringing the Dalkon Shield to
market.2 82 The court of appeals did not approve: "Here, the judge
made his comments without a trial and thus without hearing both sides
of the case. Those comments in such a context exhibit a pervasive bias
and prejudice as to deprive Robins of its due process right to a hearing
before an impartial judge."283
Interestingly, the defendant first raised the reprimand issue not in
its appeal, but in a separate complaint filed under the Act. The appeal
was from an "order" entered by Judge Lord converting the parties'
private settlement into an order of the court.2 84 The net effect of
that "order" would have been to make violation of the settlement a
contempt of court rather than a simple breach of contract.285 While
the court of appeals directed that the order be stricken, it took the
opportunity to address the reprimand as well, on the grounds that "[i]t
is far more desirable for this issue to be addressed in the normal
appellate process than in the extraordinary context of a disciplinary
proceeding." 286 Subsequent to the court of appeals' decision in
Gardiner, the Eighth Circuit Judicial Council dismissed as moot the
disciplinary complaint against Judge Lord.2 87
It is open to debate whether Judge Lord's conduct in Gardiner was,
as the court of appeals concluded, better addressed in an appellate
forum than a disciplinary proceeding. Professor Rieger argues that
formal disciplinary action should have been taken against Judge Lord,
given that repeated efforts by the court of appeals to chastise the judge
279 Id. at 438 (Lay, C.J., concurring).
280 747 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1984).
281 See id. at 1194.
282 See id. at 1186.
283 Id. at 1192.
284 See id. at 1186.
285 See id.
286 Id. at 1190.
287 See Rieger, supra note 4, at 75-77.
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in appellate and mandamus proceedings had failed to deter his chronic
misbehavior.
28 8
c. Disregard for Authority
A final category ofjudicial misbehavior concerns instances in which
lower courts have consciously flouted the dictates of a higher authority,
be it an appellate court, a judicial council, or an act of Congress. In a
limited number of cases, mandamus petitions have been granted to
enforce compliance with orders of the circuitjudicial councils. In Utah-
Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ritter,289 and Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Ritter,290 peti-
tions for writs of mandamus were granted against Chief Judge Ritter
for assigning cases in contravention of a judicial council order issued
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 137. In Hilbert v. Dooling,29 1 the district
court declined to dismiss an indictment and the defendant petitioned
the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus ordering dismissal. 292
The petition was granted on the grounds that the indictment had been
filed late, in violation of the Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt
Disposition of Criminal Cases adopted by the judicial council.293
In some cases, district courts are called to task for flouting orders
of higher courts. The remarkable Judge Ritter was again the issue in
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.2 94 Ritter ap-
proved a plan for the division of markets between two related gas
pipeline companies in an antitrust case. The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, directing Judge Ritter to order divestiture.295 Judge
Ritter's new order upheld the earlier plan, on the grounds that it
"seems to me to make a lot of sense." 296 Once again, Judge Ritter
was reversed by the Supreme Court:
[Judge Ritter's proposed decree] does the opposite of what our
prior opinion and mandate commanded. Once more, and nearly
three years after we first spoke, we reverse and remand, with
directions that there be divestiture without delay and that the
288 See id. at 92.
289 461 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1972).
290 461 F.2d 1104 (10th Cir. 1972).
291 476 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973).
292 See id. at 357.
293 See id. at 356-57, 362.
294 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
295 See id. at 142.
296 Id.
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Chief Judge of the Circuit or the Judicial Council of the Circuit
assign a different District Judge to hear the case.
297
A similar problem was confronted in Federal Home Loan Bank v.
Hall."s In that case, the district court permitted the parties to
relitigate issues previously resolved by the court of appeals. A
mandamus petition seeking an order of dismissal was granted by the
Ninth Circuit, with the following explanation: "It is clear that Respon-
dent District Judge and Respondent litigants herein have at all times
erroneously and wrongfully construed and interpreted the meaning and
intent of this Court as expressed in its three opinions and decisions,
and mandates issued pursuant thereto."'
Finally, some courts have been subject to mandamus for disregard-
ing congressional enactments. In Ex parte United States,s" the United
States petitioned for a writ of mandamus to prevent the district court
from suspending the sentence of a defendant convicted of embezzling
from a national bank, a crime which carried a minimum statutory
sentence of five years. The Supreme Court, concluding that the
"authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative,"
and that the "right to relieve from punishment ... belongs to the
executive department,""0 ' held that mandamus was warranted, but
stayed issuance of the writ long enough to permit the executive branch
to consider a pardon.3 0 2 In Maloney v. Plunkett,"'3 the district judge
discharged the jury on the grounds that the peremptory challenges
exercised by the parties in jury selection had been racially motivated,
and ordered that the new jury be selected without the use of perempto-
ry challenges.'" A writ of mandamus was sought and granted. 5 '
In ordering the district judge to proceed to trial with the original jury,
the Seventh Circuit explained:
[The district judge] deliberately refused to enforce a peremptory
(pun intended) statutory command. Section 1870 of the Judiciary
Code provides, in words that could not be clearer, that, "In civil
cases, each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challeng-
es." ... [A]nd there is no argument-there can be no argument-
297 Id. at 142-43 (citation omitted).
2" 225 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 968 (1956).
2 Id. at 384-85.
242 U.S. 27 (1916).
301 Id. at 42.
"2 See id. at 52-53.
'os 854 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1988).
so See id. at 153.
'o See id. at 156.
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that section 1870 is inapplicable to the present case. Nevertheless
Judge Plunkett forbade either side to exercise any peremptory
challenges in selecting a new jury.0 6
B. Peer Influence
Comparatively little has been written about the impact of peer
influence upon judicial conduct. It is probably safe to assume that
judges desire the respect of their colleagues to an extent no less than
anyone else. Professor Fish notes at several points in his book that the
success of the judicial conference, the judicial councils, and the chief
judge in the exercise of their disciplinary or quasi-disciplinary authority
hinges upon whether the misbehaving judge will be deterred by the
prospect of having his conduct held up for his colleagues to see.
07
Judge Irving Kaufman has argued that informal peer pressure
constitutes a critical protection against judicial aberrance. 80 8 In cases
of delay:
A judge who falls significantly behind in his work is coaxed-and
usually effectively-to keep up. If he is ... not lazy but simply
overworked, a brief respite can be arranged by his colleagues and
may prove sufficient. The Circuit Judicial Councils ... may
reassign recalcitrant judges and may order them to eliminate their
backlogs before taking on any new cases. But such open activism
is rarely necessary. Few judges are willing to risk public attention
by persistently rejecting their colleagues' overtures 0 9
In cases ofjudicial disability:
The problem can almost always be managed effectively in a
personal and informal manner.... If necessary, other judges,
attorneys, and even family members may approach the ailingjurist.
Almost invariably he will acquiesce. At least four Supreme Court
justices-Grier, Field, McKenna, and the great Holmes-retired at
the suggestion of their brothers. There is no record that any has
ever refused.... Even if the judge is slow to accept the suggestion
of his brethren, this method is sure to accomplish his ouster faster
than a formal procedure. Peer pressure is a potent tool. It should
not be underestimated because it is neither exposed to public view
nor enshrined in law. 10
306 Id. at 154.
o See FISH, supra note 6, at 154, 412.
o See Kaufman, supra note 6, at 709.
on Id. at 708 (footnote omitted).
$10Id. at 709 (footnotes omitted).
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In the relatively rare case that peer pressure alone is not enough to
deter misconduct, Judge Kaufman argues, reversal and mandamus
almost always do the trick. "The case of the late Judge Willis Ritter,"
Judge Kaufman concluded, "is not, as some have suggested, an
egregious example of a common phenomenon. It is simply an
aberration. " 3
l l
Of all the disciplinary and quasi-disciplinary measures considered
in this report, peer influence is the most difficult to quantify or assess.
Its existence is difficult to deny, and all available evidence suggests that
its impact is salutary. Chief circuit judges identified peer influence as
the third most frequently used disciplinary mechanism of eight under
consideration.3 12 Fifteen of twenty-six judges identified the deterrent
effect of peer pressure as significant or very significant (which is
comparable to other disciplinary mechanisms).3 13 Beyond that, little
can be added, except this: Judge Kaufman argues that "[t]he effective-
ness of informal peer pressure in ridding the judiciary of disabled
members is based substantially on the prevalence within the judiciary
of an atmosphere of good faith and collegiality."
3 14
The rapidly increasing size of the federal judiciary in recent years
has, in the minds of many judges, precipitated a decline in collegiali-
ty.315 Twenty-five of twenty-nine chief judges responding to the
survey agreed.31 6 The possibility thus exists that a decline in collegi-
ality may precipitate a decline in the significance of peer influence as
a disciplinary mechanism. A plurality of eleven chief circuit judges
believed that the decline in collegiality has reduced the impact of peer
influence on judicial behavior, while nine saw no effect, and two
correlated the decline in collegiality to an increase in the influence of
peer pressure.3 1 7 While hardly dispositive, these results suggest that
routine increases in the number of Article III judgeships may be
accompanied by certain hidden costs to the judiciary that ought to be
seriously considered when future increases are contemplated.
31 Id. at 710.
312 See infra app., question 1.
313 See infra app., question 2.
314 Kaufman, supra note 6, at 711.
s1' In a questionnaire prepared by the Federal Courts Study Committee for circuit
judges, "lack of collegiality" was identified most frequently as "among the chief
disadvantages of a large circuit." 2 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., Survey of the
United States Circuit Judges, in WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS (1990)
(quoting question five of the survey).
316 See infra app., question 8.
317 See infra app., question 8.
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IV. IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INFORMAL
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
As the preceding sections reflect, the strands of informal judicial
discipline are many and varied. Woven together, they form a net that
serves both as a screen that filters out and addresses misconduct before
it reaches the formal disciplinary process, and as a backstop that
captures misconduct that has bypassed or passed through the formal
disciplinary process. The strength of the informal disciplinary net and
the fineness of its weave are not entirely clear. While interview, survey,
and other data suggest that the informal process addresses a range of
judicial misbehavior and discourages its recurrence, the data also reveal
a number of weaknesses associated with the various disciplinary
strands.
In evaluating the significance of those weaknesses and the need for
reform, two caveats are in order. First, the informal disciplinary
strands comprising the net are interwoven; a weakness in one strand
will not cause misconduct to break through the net as long as one or
more other strands hold firm. Thus, where a petition for mandamus
may fail, an informal communication from the chief circuit judge may
succeed. The informal net as a whole may therefore be stronger than
the sum of its parts. Second, it is important to view the informal
disciplinary process in tandem with the formal disciplinary process.
After all, to the extent that misconduct is addressed and remedied by
the formal disciplinary process, informal processes are superfluous and
their weaknesses irrelevant. Thus, for example, every case of inexcus-
able delay addressed and remedied by the Act is a case that the
informal process need not resolve. Moreover, the formal process
serves as a "shotgun behind the door" that encourages responsiveness
to the informal disciplinary process, whatever its weaknesses may be.
Keeping these caveats in mind, we must now consider which strands
of the informal disciplinary net are frayed and where their weaknesses
can be found. Which strands are reparable, and which are not?
A. Circuit Judicial Councils
The circuit judicial councils are burdened by statutory ambiguity,
constitutional uncertainty, and a history of inaction. The councils'
statutory mandate has never expressly afforded them disciplinary
powers, and the Supreme Court shied from its one opportunity to
INFORMAL JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
explicate the constitutional limits of the councils' disciplinary authori-
ty.31s In the absence of meaningful guidance from Congress or the
Court, the councils have, with few exceptions, avoided assuming an
explicitly disciplinary role throughout their fifty-year history.
Given that the councils' exercise of their § 332 general order-
making authority to remedy misconduct has largely been a portrait of
impotence and inertia, it is tempting to recommend that their enabling
statute be amended to reinvigorate their disciplinary mission. There
are at least three reasons to question such a recommendation. First,
Congress has attempted to breathe new life into § 332, as recently as
1980,"19 to no apparent effect. Second, the Act gave the councils a
role to play in the formal disciplinary process. While the councils'
formal disciplinary role under the Act was not intended to supersede
their disciplinary mission under § 332, the fact remains that the
councils are administering judicial discipline, albeit pursuant to a
different statutory section, as illustrated by the well-publicized case of
Judge Alcee Hastings.3 2° Third, a primary reason for the councils'
apparent inertia is that informal action by chief circuit judges-who
chair the councils-has often made formal council action unneces-
sary. 2 That is not to say that the councils are superfluous, however,
for the specter of formal council action has improved the ability of
chief circuit judges to handle matters privately.
B. Mandamus and Appeal
The processes of mandamus, reversal, and recusal require the
victims ofjudicial misconduct to complain formally and on the record.
Victims unwilling to risk alienating the judge before whom their case
is pending or before whom they may appear in future cases will not
employ such quasi-disciplinary mechanisms.3 22 Moreover, the victim
ofjudicial misconduct who steels herself to petition for mandamus or
to move for recusal will prevail only if she is able to meet stringent
51s See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
519 See Kastenmeier & Remington, supra note 7, at 723.
20 Judge Hastings was prosecuted and acquitted for bribery. TheJudicial Council
for the Eleventh Circuit, however, undertook to investigate the matter pursuant to its
authority under the Act. The Council ultimately recommended that Congress
institute impeachment proceedings. See generally United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d
706 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); see also Todd D. Peterson, The
Role of the Executive Branch in the Discipline and Removal of Federal Judges, in 1
RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 8, at 243, 266-69.
321 See supra notes 160-98 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 50-53, 217-22 and accompanying text.
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legal standards, meaning that relief is available only for the most
egregious misbehavior or nonfeasance. 23 Even then, the appellate
court that grants relief often characterizes the misbehavior in question
as a mistake to be corrected, rather than as misconduct to be avoided,
making its action nondisciplinary in tone and effect.
While requiring the victims of courtroom misconduct to file
motions, petitions, and appeals undeniably limits the role that
mandamus and recusal play in judicial discipline, the attending
problems are mostly unavoidable. Motions, petitions, and appeals are
not designed to achieve disciplinary ends, even though their resolution
may sometimes serve a disciplinary purpose. Rather, they are
procedural tools designed for use in an adversarial system of justice.
By definition, the adversarial process is one in which adversaries
actively and aggressively do battle in open court; there is no place in
such a system for hearing anonymous, informal complaints about
judicial conduct.
The stringency of the legal standards associated with mandamus
and recusal could, of course, be relaxed by statute. But again,
disciplining judicial misconduct is not the only concern here; the
stability and integrity of the judicial process are also at issue. Relaxed
mandamus standards translate into more petitions being filed, more
frequent disruptions of district court proceedings, and more work for
circuit courts. Relaxed recusal standards translate into more motions,
more recusals, and fewer judges available to hear pending cases.
C. Informal Action by Chief Circuit Judges, Chief District
Judges, and Peer Judges
Judicial council orders and orders issued in mandamus and
appellate proceedings are "informal" methods ofjudicial discipline only
in the limited sense that their "formal" purpose is nondisciplinary.
They are nevertheless "formal" to the extent that their scope and
structure are dictated by statute, and, in the case of mandamus,
reversal, and recusal, by judicial precedent as well. Informal action by
chief circuit judges, chief district judges, and peer judges, in contrast,
is truly informal. It is unencumbered by the structural impediments
that limit the flexibility and scope of other "informal," quasi-disciplin-
ary devices. With greater flexibility and scope comes an improved
ability to respond to misconduct in ways that meet the unique needs of
the particular situation: a friendly, off-the-record chat in one case, a
323 See supra notes 48-50, 206-07 and accompanying text.
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stern dressing-down in another, raising the specter of formal disciplin-
ary action in a third, and a threatened disclosure to the press in a
fourth.
Consequently, it is understandable that the chief circuit judges who
responded to the questionnaire and spoke with Barr and Wiliging
expressed a high level of satisfaction with informal action by chief and
peerjudges as a means to address misconduct and disability.324 But the
flexibility to address these problems as the chief judge sees fit, with a
range of private, unofficial approaches-the informal mechanisms'
greatest virtue-may also be their greatest vice.
With unstructured informality comes a lack of visibility. The
problem is illustrated by a relatively frequent occurrence: a chief
circuit judge is alerted to misconduct after it occurs and responds
promptly, privately, and in a manner that discourages recurrence.
While the chief may consider the problem solved, the public may not
have been aware that a problem existed, and if aware that a problem
existed, would probably not have been aware that it was rectified. For
its part, the public sees lots of judges and little formal disciplinary
action. Thus, the perception persists that judges cannot be trusted to
judge themselves and that a significant volume of misconduct goes
unremedied.
Congress or the Judicial Conference could address the visibility
problem by requiring each circuit to file an annual report with the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Such a report
should indicate the number of, nature of, and grounds for informal
disciplinary actions taken by the chief circuit judge in the absence of
a § 372(c) complaint. By furnishing a more complete picture of
disciplinary and quasi-disciplinary activity, annual reports could serve
to dispel the perception that the judiciary is not policing itself. In
taking steps to make the informal disciplinary process more visible,
however, care must be taken not to sacrifice the flexibility and
confidentiality that enable the process to work. The annual report
requirement should not, for example, insist upon the inclusion of
identifying information about the judges in question. In such a case,
the ability of the chiefjudge to seek the target judge's cooperation in
a collegial, confidential atmosphere would be lost.
More troubling than lack of visibility, perhaps, is that with
unstructured informality comes a lack of formal guidance to instruct
the chiefjudge. Suppose that a lawyer or court employee approaches
324 See supra notes 55, 114-16, 159, 179-94 and accompanying text.
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the chief judge and complains privately about a particular judge's
behavior. Whether and how the chief circuit judge responds must, in
the absence of more formal guidance from a statute, rule, or court
decision, depend on her private perception of the judge's conduct.
Was it misconduct at all? If so, was it serious enough to worry about?
Did it require anything more than a friendly word over the phone to
rectify? To the extent that a formal complaint is never filed, which the
survey data suggest occurs a significant majority of the time, the chief
judge's unguided and unreviewable interpretation of the conduct in
question will dictate if and how discipline is administered.
How, for example, is a chief circuit judge to handle an informal
complaint implicating gender bias by a malejudge? Comments by chief
judges in both the questionnaire and interviews with Barr and Willging
reflect the view that gender bias is a form of misconduct deserving
corrective action.325 But can chief judges be counted on to "know
it when they see it" and to respond appropriately?
Of the forty-five present and former chief circuit judges who
received the questionnaire in the Appendix, forty-two (93.3%) were
men. The Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force found that female
judges and judicial officers perceive that gender bias occurs more
frequently and see its impact as more deleterious than do their male
counterparts. 26 To the extent that this reflects a less than complete
appreciation for gender bias problems by male judges, it suggests that
chief circuit judges, the vast preponderance of whom are male, may be
insufficiently sensitized to gender bias issues called to their attention
informally. The net effect may be that episodes of gender bias are too
often not recognized as such, or not taken seriously, and so are not
addressed or remedied by the informal disciplinary process.
Addressing the guidance problem requires that greater emphasis
be placed on identifying issues about which judges may be unacquaint-
ed, and acquainting them. That means commissioning studies on such
325 See infra app., question 6.
326 See NINTH CIRCurr GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE, THE EFFECTS OF GENDER IN THE
FEDERAL CouRTs 63 (1992) ("Although most male and female judges believe that
cutting off female counsel's argument evidences gender bias, only half of male judges,
compared to almost three-quarters of female judges, believe that this style of
interaction imposes special burdens on female counsel."); id. at 73 ("[S]mall
percentages of male judges and larger percentages of female judges said they have
heard judicial colleagues disparage female judges' competence ... ."); id. at 104
("[T]he male ALJs surveyed virtually unanimously concluded that they had not heard
any disparaging gender-based remarks .... In contrast, four of the seven women
ALJs who responded reported such remarks occurring 'frequently' to 'somewhat
frequently' .... ).
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issues as gender bias. 27 It means integrating the results of those
studies into programs developed by the Federal Judicial Center for the
purpose of sensitizing federaljudges to problems about which they may
be unaware. 28 It means amending formal mechanisms, such as the
Act and the Judicial Code of Conduct, from which chief judges take
their cues in making informal assessments about judicial behavior.3 29
It means, in effect, taking pains to ensure that the shared assumptions
of the judges who administer informal discipline are as informed as
possible.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined a number of informal methods of
judicial discipline: circuitjudicial council orders, informal communica-
tions from chief circuit and district judges, appellate court orders of
reversal and mandamus, and peer judge influence. None of these so-
called "disciplinary" mechanisms is solely or even primarily disciplinary
by design. Still, all are occasionally, and in some cases commonly, used
to address judicial misbehavior and disability. Of all the disciplinary
mechanisms evaluated here, the least formal-communications from
chief and peer judges-appear to be utilized the most frequently and
successfully. The vitality of several of these informal disciplinary
mechanisms should provide some comfort to those concerned that the
infrequency with which formal discipline is imposed may mean that a
significant volume of misconduct is being overlooked or ignored. This
is not to suggest that discipline under the Act is unimportant. Indeed,
it is in part because a formal disciplinary mechanism is in place that
informal means of discipline are so successful. Nor is it true that
informal methods of judicial discipline are trouble free. To the
327 Although the Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, issued in 1990,
expressly declined to recommend further study of gender bias, see FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 169 (1990), the
National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal recommended that each
circuit conduct studies of racial, religious, ethnic, and gender bias. See NATIONAL
COMM'N ONJUDICiAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 126 (1993).
s28 The Report of the Federal Court Study Committee made just such a
recommendation with respect to gender bias. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM.,
supra note 327, at 169. The Federal.Judicial Center is in the process of developing
gender bias materials for use in judicial education.
829 The National Commission onjudicial Discipline and Removal recommended
changes in the Code of Conduct for United StatesJudges to prohibit racial, religious,
ethnic, and gender bias. See NATIONAL COMM'N ONJUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL,
supra note 327, at 99.
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contrary, I have argued that informal judicial discipline has been
insufficiently publicized, and that efforts should be made to better
inform the public as to its existence and scope-particularly with regard
to the critical role of the chief circuit judge in regulating misconduct
and disability. Moreover, because informal processes depend for their
success upon the conscientiousness and responsiveness of the chief
judges who administer those processes, it is imperative that chief
judges be sensitized to disciplinary problems they might not otherwise
define as such. In the final analysis, the essential point is simply that
informal processes serve a critical role in addressing judicial miscon-
duct and disability, and that understanding those processes and their
operation is essential to a fuller appreciation ofjudicial discipline.
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APPENDIX
Questionnaire and Summary of Responses
A. DISCIPLINARY MECHANISMS COMPARED
1. In light of your experience as chiefjudge, rank the following eight
disciplinary and quasi-disciplinary mechanisms as to the frequency
with which they are used to remedy judicial misconduct in your
circuit from I (least) to 8 (most):
a. impeachment
b. criminal prosecution
c. discipline pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)
d. circuit council orders under 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1)
e. informal actions of the chief circuit judge
f. informal actions of chief district judge
g. judicial action, e.g., mandamus, appellate review
h. informal actions of peer judges
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TABLE A-i
Summary of Responses to Question 1
Estimated Frequency













Number ofJudges per Response
18 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 12 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 2
2 3
8 3 5 1 1 3
7 10 1 1 0 0
0 2 0 2 3 4 4
1 2 1 0 2 6 9
1 2
1 1
2 4 4 4 1 6










2. Assess the extent to which the threat or availability of each of the
following disciplinary or quasi-disciplinary measures serves as a
general deterrent to judicial misconduct. Please circle the
appropriate number for each measure.
Very
Don't Not a Mild Signtficant Signsfcant
Know Deterrent Deterrent Deterrent Deterrent
a. impeachment
b. criminal prosecution
c. discipline pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 372(c)
d. judicial council actions
under 28 U.S.C.
§ 332(d)(1)
e. informal actions of the
chief circuit judge
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4




Don't Not a Mild Significant Significant
Know Deterrent Deterrent Deterrent Deterrent








1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
TABLE A-2












1 2 3 4 5










3. Of the instances that you have considered to be "true" judicial
misconduct in your circuit coming to your attention while chief
judge, approximately what percentage were ever the subject of a
complaint filed under 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)? Please circle the letter
corresponding to the range that best represents the best estimate
of your experience.
a. 0-10% b. 11-20% c. 21-30%
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d. 31-40% e. 41-50% f. 51-60%
g. 61-70%
j. 91-100%
h. 71-80% i. 81-90%
TABLE A-3












4. A former chief circuit judge has stated that 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)
"produces substantial indirect benefits. It brings to the attention
of the chief judge matters that may not fall within the statute but
nevertheless deserve attention. The procedure gives the chief
judge the opportunity to correct these measures." Do you agree or










c. No Opinion 1
B. JUDICIAL COUNCIL ACTION
5. a. During your tenure as chiefjudge, did you and/or the circuit
judicial council investigate or consider reports of judicial
misconduct or decision-making delay coming to your attention
by means other than a formal complaint filed pursuant to
§ 372(c)? Please circle the appropriate number.
1) yes (please answer 5.b.)
2) no (please skip to section C)
b. Please indicate the total number of instances in which you
and/or the circuit judicial council investigated or considered
such reports.
c. In how many of these instances did you consult with the
judicial council about the matter?
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TABLE A-4
Summay of Responses to Question 4
Responses
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TABLE A-5




b. Total Investigations 141-52
c. Referred to Judicial 53-56
Council
6. a. If your answer to question 5.a. was "yes," did your investigation
or consideration of a report ofjudicial misconduct or decision-
making delay, that came to your attention by means other than
a formal complaint filed pursuant to § 372(c), ever lead you
and/or the judicial council to take any remedial action, either
formal or informal? Please circle the appropriate number.
1) yes (please answer 6.b.)
2) no (please skip to section C)
b. Please indicate in how many instances remedial action was
taken, and the nature of the conduct addressed. Place a
number in the blank.
On _ occasions, remedial action was taken.
The conduct addressed was ....
c. If your answer to subpart a. of this question was "yes," what
remedial action or actions have you and/or the judicial council
taken? Please circle as many numbers as apply, and indicate in
the blank spaces how many times each type of remedial action
was taken.
1) In _ instances, the judicial council issued a formal remedi-
al order.
2) In _ instances, I identified a complaint under § 372(c).
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3) In - instances, I communicated with the judge in ques-
tion.
4) In __ instances, one or more of the judicial council, other
than myself, communicated with the judge in question.
5) In __ instances, I and/or the judicial council requested
another judicial officer not on the judicial council (e.g., a
chief district judge or a friend of the judge in question) to
communicate with the judge in question.
6) In _instances, I and/or the judicial council took remedial
action not enumerated in (1)-(5) above. Please specify.
TABLE A-6




b. Actions Taken 85-92
c. 1) J.C. Order 7
2) § 372(c) Complaint 11
3) C.J. Communication 77-80
4) OtherJ.C. Communication 10
5) Other Judge Communication 14
6) Other 11
C. OTHER MEANS OF REGULATING JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
7. Does the existence of the 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) complaint procedure
create any incentives or disincentives for judges to respond
constructively to informal efforts by you as chiefjudge to remedy
judicial misconduct or disability where no formal complaint is
filed? Circle the appropriate letter.
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a. It has created more incentives than disincentives for judges to
respond constructively to informal efforts by the chiefjudge to
remedy misconduct or disability.
b. It has created more disincentives than incentives for judges to
respond constructively to informal efforts by the chiefjudge to
remedy misconduct or disability.
c. It has created about an equal level of incentives and disincen-
tives for judges to respond constructively to informal efforts by
the chiefjudge to remedy misconduct or disability.
d. It has not created any incentives or disincentives for judges to
respond constructively to informal efforts by the chiefjudge to
remedy misconduct or disability.
e. Other (specify):
TABLE A-7
Summary of Responses to Question 7
Answer Responses
a. More Incentives 22




8. a. It has been argued that the increased size of the federal
judiciary has had an adverse affect upon "collegiality" among
judges, in that it has resulted in a dilution of professional and
social relationships, and a decline in esprit de corps. Do you







b. If you strongly or mildly agree that the increased size of the
judiciary has resulted in a decline in collegiality, has the decline
had any effect upon the potency of judicial "peer pres-
sure"-what fellow judges may think or say to each other about
particular conduct-as a vehicle for encouraging ethical and
responsible behavior? Circle the number corresponding to
your response.
1) The influence of "peer pressure" is reduced by the decline
in collegiality.
2) The influence of "peer pressure" is increased by the
decline in collegiality.
3) The influence of "peer pressure" has not been affected by
the decline in collegiality.
4) No opinion.
TABLE A-8
Summary of Responses to Question 8
Answer Responses
a. 1) Strongly Agree 7.5
2) Mildly Agree 17.5
3) Mildly Disagree 3
4) Strongly Disagree 1
5) No Opinion 0
b. 1) Reduced 11
2) Increased 2
3) Unaffected 9
4) No Opinion 3
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D. THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE ON RETIREMENT
AND RESIGNATION PURSUANT TO
28 U.S.C. § 372(A) & (B)
9. a. Since 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) became effective in 1981, has the
filing or processing of a complaint pursuant to that section
culminated in a judge in your circuit resigning, retiring, or
being certified as disabled? Circle the number that corre-
sponds to your response.
1) yes (please answer 9.b.)
2) no (please skip to question 10)
b. How many judges have resigned, retired or been certified as
disabled? Place a number in the appropriate blanks.
- judges retired or resigned following complaints of conduct
prejudicial to the effective administration of the business of the
courts, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1).
- judges were retired or resigned following complaints of
disability, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1).
-judges certified as disabled by the judicial council following
complaints of disability, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 372(b) and(c)(6)(B1)(ii).
1993] INFORMAL JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
TABLE A-9




b. Resigned after § 372 misconduct complaint 5(4)*
Resigned after § 372 disability complaint 2
Certified disabled after § 372 complaint 7 (3 or 4)*
10. a. Since 1981, has any judge in your circuit been certified as
disabled by order of the judicial council under 28 U.S.C.
§ 372(b), where no complaint was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 372(c)? Circle the number that corresponds to your re-
sponse.
1) yes (please answer 10.b.)
2) no (please skip to question 11)
b. How many judges have been the subject of such an order?
TABLE A-10




b. Total 15 (12-13)*
11. a. Since 1981, has any judge resigned or retired following
informal action by you or a prior chiefjudge of the circuit (or
* Numbers in parentheses take into account the possibility of double counting by
respondents within the same circuit.
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an agent of the chief judge), in response to evidence of
misconduct or disability, where no complaint was filed pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)? Circle the appropriate number.
1) yes (please answer 11.b.)
2) no (please skip to section E)
b. How many judges have resigned or retired following such
informal action? Place a number in the appropriate blanks.
- judges retired or resigned following allegations of miscon-
duct.
- judges retired or resigned following allegations of disabili-
ty.
TABLE A-11






E. JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AS A MEANS OF REGULATING
INACTION AND DELAY
12. a. Do you ordinarily dismiss complaints that a judge has delayed
excessively in deciding a particular case? Please circle the
appropriate number.
1) yes
* Numbers in parentheses take into account the possibility of double counting by
respondents within the same circuit.
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2) no
3) I don't know
b. If your answer to subpart a. was "yes," which statement best
characterizes your reasons for ordinarily dismissing such
complaints? Please circle as many numbers as apply.
1) A judge who fails to act has not "engaged in conduct"
prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration
of the courts' business, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 372(c)(1).
2) Delays are properly remedied by petitions for mandamus
and therefore relate to the merits of a decision or ruling.
3) Delay in an isolated case does not constitute conduct
prejudicial to the administration of the courts' business; the
delay must be habitual or otherwise involve corrupt
behavior.
4) The complaint procedure is not ordinarily an effective way
to deal with delay in an isolated case.
5) Other (please specify):
c. If your answer to subpart a. was "no," which statement best
characterizes your reasons for not routinely dismissing such
complaints? Please circle as many as apply.
1) Excessive delay in isolated cases may be subject to disci-
pline under § 37 2(c).
2) Complaints of excessive delay in isolated cases are investi-
gated to determine if delay is an habitual problem, and are
later dismissed if it is not found to be habitual.
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3) Other (please specify):
TABLE A-12





b. 1) Not Conduct 0
2) Merits Related 11
3) Not Prejudicial 10
4) Not Effective 8
5) Other 1
c. 1) Delay within § 372 5
2) Delay within § 372 if habitual 5
3) Other 0
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13. Assess the overall effectiveness of the following measures for
remedying judicial neglect and unjustified delay by circling the
appropriate number.
Very In- Somewhat Somewhat Very I Don't
effective Ineffective Effective Effective Know
a. public disclosure




ant to 28 U.S.C. 1 2 3 4 5
§ 372(c)
c. judicial council




e. informal actions 1 2 3 4 5
of peer judges
f. mandamus 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5g. other
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TABLE A-13
Summary of Responses to Question 13
Estimated Effectiveness
1 2 3 4 5
Disciplinary Action Number ofJudges per Response Average
a. CJRA 0 1 7 12 7 3.55
b. § 372(c) 4 5 8 4 4 2.71
c. § 332(d)(1) 3 5 6 5 6 2.68
d. Informal Chief Judge 1 1 10.5 15.5 1 3.44
Action
e. Peer Pressure 3 2 15.5 3.5 3 2.79
f. Mandamus 1.5 5.5 3 15 1 3.26
j. Other 0 0 0 0 0 0
F. BURDENS ON THE CHIEF JUDGE
The final questions are designed to provide information about the
burdens that administering the discipline act place on you as chief
judge.
14. Hours spent: Excluding time you spent as a member of any special
committee, how many hours of your time do or did you spend in
an average month administering § 372(c)? Please circle one.
a. less than five hours per month
b. six to ten hours per month
c. eleven to fifteen hours per month
d. sixteen to twenty hours per month
e. more than twenty hours per month
INFORMAL JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
TABLE A-14
Summary of Responses to Question 14
Percentage of All
Answer Responses Responses
a. Under 5 Hours 10 34%
b. 6-10 Hours 9 31%
c. 11-15 Hours 5 17%
d. 16-20 Hours 4 14%
e. Over 20 Hours 1 3%
15. Information consulted in making decision to dismiss: Regarding
§ 372(c) complaints that you dismissed, we would like your best
estimate (without researching your dismissal orders) of the
percentage in which you could make your decision on the basis of
the complaint alone, and of the percentage of complaints as to
which you needed to use other types of information. Please fill in
blanks.
a. Approximate percentage of dismissed complaints in which you
made decision to dismiss on basis of complaint (including
attachments) alone: -TO
b. Approximate percentage of dismissed complaints in which the
following types of information beyond the complaint were
considered (note that these percentages may add up to more
than 100 because several sorts of information may be consid-
ered in a given case):
1) Additional materials from the record or clerk's files in any
related litigation (such as transcripts of hearings, docket
sheets, filings in court, etc.): -TO
2) Response (written or oral) from judge complained against:
___%
3) Other information (please specify):
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16. Delegation: A former chiefjudge has expressed the opinion that the
confidentiality provisions of the Act restrict a chief judge's ability
to delegate tasks involved in handling § 372(c) complaints. Other
chief judges seem to rely on staff for assistance with a number of
tasks. We are interested in your opinion about whether 28 U.S.C.
§ 37 2(c) permits the chiefjudge to delegate the following activities
to a staff member for purposes of advising or making a recommen-
dation to the chiefjudge, and whether in your handling of § 372(c)
complaints you have in fact delegated any of them. Please indicate
your responses by circling the appropriate response (Y for yes and




a. Reviewing complaint and any attachments
b. Obtaining and reviewing the record or
court files in related litigation
c. Investigating the facts
d. Research applicable precedents (e.g., Code
ofJudicial Conduct, Illustrative Rules, prior
§ 372(c) cases)
e. Preparing a draft memorandum or order of
dismissal
Act allows dele- I have
gation delegated
Y N Y N





Summary of Responses to Question 16
Activity
a. Reviewing complaint
b. Obtaining and reviewing related litigation
c. Investigating the facts
d. Research applicable precedent
e. Preparing a draft memorandum/order
Act allows I have
delegation: delegated:
Responses Responses
Y N Y N
21 3 16 8
23 2 15 7
22 3 18 6
25 0 18 7
24 1 19 6
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